

MOZAMBIQUE Food Security Outlook

June 2022 to January 2023

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is likely to persist through early 2023, with needs projected to remain high

KEY MESSAGES

- Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes prevail throughout Mozambique for most poor households supported by the recently harvested crops from the 2021/22 agricultural season. However, in drought-affected areas of southern and central Mozambique, a poor harvest, depleted food reserves, and limited income-generating opportunities will likely result in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. In Nampula province, areas affected by storms/cyclones earlier in the year are likely in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) due to the loss of harvests and livelihood assets. In Cabo Delgado, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) acute food insecurity outcomes persist, driven by the ongoing conflict. Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes will prevail in areas with the regular distribution of humanitarian food assistance.
- In May, Food Security Cluster (FSC) partners provided humanitarian food assistance to around 374,000 beneficiaries in Cabo Delgado and Niassa, following the distribution to about 650,000 beneficiaries in April, assisting around 1,025,000 people over the two months. Due to limited resources, WFP is distributing half rations equivalent to 39 percent of a 2100 kilocalorie diet to around 850,000 people in Cabo Delgado and 74,000 in Nampula and Niassa, with the remainder of beneficiaries supported by other members of the FSC Cluster. Approximately 26 percent of the HFA was provided as in-kind assistance, 67 percent via vouchers, and 7 percent via

Current food security outcomes, June 2022 TANZANIA ZAMBIA Delgado ΜΑΙ Α\ Tete Zambezia ZIMBABWE Manica IPC V3.I Acute Food Insecurity Phase 1: Minimal 2: Stressed 3: Crisis SOUTH 4: Emergency Maput Would likely be at least one phase worse without current or programme humanitarian assistance Mabuto

Source: FEWS NET

FEWS NET classification is IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners.

Immediate Response Rations (IRRs). WFP is warning that there is a potential pipeline break in October if additional funding is not secured soon. Targeted humanitarian assistance is also taking place in Zambezia and Nampula provinces in areas affected by Cyclone Gombe, with WFP assisting around 97,000 people in May.

- In May, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) year-on-year inflation rose to 9.3 percent, the highest since September 2017. The biggest contributors to the monthly inflation rate were food and non-alcoholic beverages (3.4 percent month-on-month) and transport (1.1 percent month-on-month). According to Mozambique's National Institute of Statistics (INE), price increases in wheat, petrol, diesel, cooking oil, and bar soap are contributing the most to the monthly inflation rate. Following the increase in fuel prices, bread prices increased by 20 percent and transportation prices increased by 50 percent along certain routes The rising costs are likely to reduce household purchasing power, particularly in urban areas where households are more market dependent.
- The delayed harvests are ongoing across Mozambique, particularly in high production areas such as the plateaus of Tete, Zambézia, Manica, and Sofala, the interior of Nampula and western Cabo Delgado, and Niassa province. While official production estimates are not yet available, a near-average national production is likely following a rapid food security assessment in mid-May 2022, along with ongoing investments in agricultural production such as the government's SUSTENTA program. Additionally, remote sensing products, such as the water requirement satisfaction Index (WRSI), indicate that as of May 30, crop production is likely to be average to good, except in areas affected by poor climate shocks (poor rainfall, storms/cyclone, flooding) and conflict.



NATIONAL OVERVIEW


Current Situation

Most rural households face Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes, supported by their recently harvested crops from the 2021/22 agricultural season. However, in drought-affected areas of southern and central Mozambique, a poor harvest, depletion of food reserves, and limited income-generating opportunities are resulting in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. In Nampula province, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely to emerge in the areas most affected by the storms/cyclone earlier in the year, following a poor harvest, limited income-earning opportunities, and a reduction in the ability for mutual help among households. In Cabo Delgado, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist, mainly driven by conflict since late 2017 and exacerbated by recent attacks in areas previously considered safe, such as the Ancuabe district. However, the regular distribution of humanitarian food assistance (HFA) in some areas of Cabo Delgado supports Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes.

Harvests are ongoing throughout Mozambique, particularly in high production areas such as the plateaus of Tete, Zambézia, Manica and Sofala, the interior of Nampula and Cabo Delgado, and Niassa. However, poor to failed crop production is likely in much of southern Mozambique following the extended dry spell in February (Figure 1). In the central region, below average and irregular rainfall distribution also resulted in crop failure and/or reduced crop yields in the southern Manica and Sofala provinces. In these drought-affected areas, very poor and poor households are likely to have insufficient income for market food purchases and cannot meet their minimum food needs. As a result, these households are prematurely beginning to intensify their typical coping strategies, including selling more animals than usual, spending their savings, borrowing money or food, engaging in the production and sale of charcoal, or reducing spending on non-food items to buy food, resulting in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. However, the most vulnerable poorest households, who have few or no livestock, little to no capacity to produce charcoal, and are unable to borrow, are likely already facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes and are engaging in consumption-based coping strategies such as skipping meals, reducing meal sizes, consuming less preferred food varieties, and increasing the consumption of wild foods to minimize food consumption gaps.


While official production estimates are currently unavailable, estimates through the WRSI, indicate that nationally, the water satisfaction index for maize is 10 percent below the five-year average for Mozambique. However, national production is likely to be near average, supported by ongoing agricultural investments such as the SUSTENTA program, particularly in the high production areas. Additionally, late rains in April improved residual soil

Projected food security outcomes, June to September 2022



Source: FEWS NET

Projected food security outcomes, October 2022 to January 2023



Source: FEWS NET

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moisture, supporting second season production of crops and vegetables in central and southern Mozambique. The second season harvest is likely to be close to average, as most households in the country likely have access to seeds, while the distribution of seeds by NGOs is likely ongoing in post-cyclone affected areas.

In the semi-arid zone of southern Tete Province, Guro and Tambara districts in northern Manica Province, and parts of central Sofala province, main season crops were also affected by prolonged dry spells, irregular rainfall distribution, and abnormally high temperatures. As a result, most poor households have already exhausted their own food stocks and are dependent on market purchases much earlier than usual, driving Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. The poorest households are likely to continue expanding their livelihood coping strategies, such as consuming less preferred foods, engaging in the production and sale of charcoal in more remote markets, selling more animals than usual, spending savings if available, and purchasing food on credit or borrowing food to meet their basic food needs.

In Cabo Delgado, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist due to ongoing conflict displacing households and disrupting access to income and food. From June 1-14, attacks by the insurgents across eastern Cabo Delgado, including previously conflict-free areas of Ancuabe and Chiúre districts displaced over 23,000 people according to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix. Before May, the insurgents frequently carried out small-scale attacks primarily in Macomia, Mueda, Nangade, and Meluco, with small insurgent cells seeking to loot food and supplies from unguarded places. Most IDPs remain dependent on emergency humanitarian assistance to fill food consumption gaps. Some IDPs living in the resettlement/accommodation centers also earn income from selling gifts/aid, and from limited skilled and casual work opportunities. If displaced households can earn income, most are spending it to purchase food. In areas where humanitarian food assistance (HFA) is regular and supports at least one in five households with 25 percent of food needs, Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are present.

In Nampula's coastal and intermediate areas severely affected by tropical cyclone Gombe and two tropical storms, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely emerging among the poorest households as household food stocks diminish. The poorest households also have limited access to income for market purchases to fill food consumption gaps due to the loss of livelihood assets and limited job opportunities as the area recovers. In Ilha de Moçambique, Mogincual, and Mossuril districts, food access is also deteriorating after many poor households lost their homes, food reserves, and the assets typically used to earn income and access food.

Figure 1. Water Requirements
Satisfaction Index (WRSI) for maize,
extended to the end of the season, as of
May 31, 2022

CROP WR SI
maize:2022-05-3

< 50 Failure

50-59 Poor

60-79 Mediocre
80-94 Av erage

Source: FEWS NET

95-99 Good

Yet to Start

100 Very Good
No Start (late)

In mid-to-late April 2022, the FAO, in collaboration with provincial and district government institutions at provincial and district levels and the FSC conducted a field assessment in Nampula, Zambezia, and Sofala following cyclone Gombe. Findings from the Post Cyclone Gombe Mozambique report indicate that the cyclone resulted in widespread flooding, loss of crops in the field, and the loss of livestock and grain storage facilities. In Nampula and Sofala districts, households reported on average having one to seven months of food reserves; however, the percentage of households reporting to have food reserves in each district ranged from 0 to 70 percent. To help households recover from Cyclone Gombe, FAO is advocating for the continuation of food assistance along with the provision and repair of fishing gear and boats, and short-cycle seeds and other agricultural inputs for the second season and upcoming 2022/2023 cropping season to enable households to recover quickly.

Maize grain prices are starting to decline in most markets with the start of the delayed harvest. From April to May 2022, maize grain prices declined by 3-21 percent in most monitored markets, while in the markets of Lichinga and Mocuba the price of maize grain remains relatively stable after declining by 5-7 percent last month. The delay in seasonal market price reductions is driven by the delayed harvests and below-average availability of maize grains in some areas due to the impact of shocks, such as storms/cyclones, floods and droughts. Compared to last year, maize grain prices had a mixed trend. In May 2022, prices were 16-45 percent below last year's in Maputo, Manica, Angónia, Mocuba, and Lichinga markets, 7-24 percent above last year's in Chókwe, Massinga, and Mutarara markets, and at the same level in all other markets.

Similarly, maize grain prices had a mixed trend compared to the five-year average. May 2022 prices were 6-55 percent above the five-year average in Maputo, Chókwe, Maxixe, Quelimane, Massinga, Mutarara and Montepuez, 6-15 percent below the five-year average in Manica, Angónia, and Lichinga, and stable in Mocuba. Maize meal and rice prices were stable from April to May 2022 in most monitored markets. However, in Chókwe, the price of maize meal declined by 25 percent, and the price of rice increased by 6 percent and 27 percent in Lichinga and Inhambane after declining by 9 percent and 21 percent, respectively, in the previous month. Local dynamics of demand and supply are likely driving these monthly fluctuations in the price of maize meal and rice. Both maize meal and rice prices had a mixed trend when compared to last year's prices and the five-year average. For example, maize meal prices were 9-18 percent above prices last year in Chókwe, Pemba, Angónia, and Lichinga, 6-10 percent below last year's prices in Maxixe, Massinga, Mocuba and stable in all other monitored markets. Compared to the five-year average, maize meal prices were 7 percent and 25 percent above the five-year average in Inhambane and Lichinga, respectively, and had a stable trend in all other markets.

According to the National Statistics Institute (INE), monthly inflation increased by 1 percent between April and May 2022, mostly driven by increasing prices in wheat bread (15.6 percent), gasoline (2.1 percent), cooking oil (3.7 percent), soap bars (5.2 percent), tomatoes (1.2 percent), fresh fish (1.4 percent), and diesel (2.9 percent). In May, year-on-year inflation was 9.31 percent with Transport and Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages increasing by 13.65 percent and 13.51 percent,

respectively. The continuous increases in the cost of basic products are reducing household purchasing power, particularly for the poorest households in urban and peri-urban areas. As a result, many households are readjusting their expenditures to account for the price increases. The rise in inflation is partly being driven by the high global oil and fuel prices, along with the global supply chain disruptions related to the Russia-Ukraine war and the COVID-19 pandemic. These global supply chain tensions may be exacerbated by the tropical storms/cyclones that hit central and northern Mozambique earlier this year, and the ongoing war in Cabo Delgado. According to Oxford Economics, Mozambican motorists are paying 33 percent more for petroleum than 12 months ago. The government has ruled out the possibility of increasing subsidies to fuel stations and bakeries, although new ways of alleviating the cost of living for the most vulnerable households is being determined.

In May, FSC partners assisted around 374,000 beneficiaries in Cabo Delgado and Niassa, following assistance distribution to about 650,000 beneficiaries in April. Due to limited resources, WFP is distributing a full ration each month that is expected to last two months, resulting in monthly half rations equivalent to 39 percent of a 2100 kilocalorie diet. WFP is providing HFA to about 850,000 people in Cabo Delgado and 74,000 people in Nampula and Niassa. Other FSC members are providing assistance to the remaining beneficiaries. Additionally, WFP assisted around 33,400 beneficiaries in the Nangade district in northern Cabo Delgado, the highest number of beneficiaries since resuming distributions in this district in February. In May, approximately 26 percent of the HFA was in-kind assistance, 67 percent as vouchers, and 7 percent as Immediate Response Rations (IRRs), which target populations on the move or in hard-to-reach areas. However, WFP is warning that there is a potential pipeline break in October, even with a continuation with half rations, if additional funding is not secured soon. WFP expects to move towards prioritized targeting of the most vulnerable populations, including IDPs and host communities, once the Vulnerability Based Targeting exercise is finalized in the last quarter of 2022. Humanitarian partners also engaged in livelihood interventions for approximately 65,000 people, primarily IDPs in resettlement sites and host communities. Targeted humanitarian assistance is also taking place in areas affected by Cyclone Gombe and related floods, where WFP assisted around 97,000 people in May in the provinces of Zambezia and Nampula. Humanitarian needs are expected to remain high in conflict, flood, and drought-affected areas.

Assumptions


The June 2022 to January 2023 most likely scenario is based on the following national-level assumptions:

- Based on forecast model confidence at long leads, above-average rainfall is most likely across the southern half of
 Southern Africa between October 2022 and January 2023 due to the forecast La Nina conditions, while below average
 rainfall is most likely in some northern and northeastern parts of the region. A normal start to the season is expected.
 There is an average probability of floods and/or cyclones occurring during the scenario period.
- The national water supply is expected to be average to above average, driven by the recharge from the 2021/22 season and the expected average rainfall in 2022/23. As a result, there is an increased likelihood of river overflows and increased dam discharges that result in downstream flooding and the destruction of farms along the main rivers.
- Nationally, maize grain market availability is likely to be near average for the 2022/2023 consumption year supported by
 the 2022 main harvest, carryover stocks from 2021, and the second season crop production. However, in the semi-arid
 areas affected by drought in the south and center, the areas severely affected by tropical storms and tropical cyclones,
 mainly the coastal part of Nampula, and the areas affected by the conflict, household access to maize grain will be below
 average due to high prices.
- The internal flow of food commodities to the main consumption markets is likely to occur at normal levels for the main staple foods, including maize grain, moving from traditional high production areas to deficit areas. Following the harvest, trade flows to the southern semi-arid areas and the coastal regons of Nampula are likely to be above average to fill market demand.
- Cross border trade with Malawi, Zimbabwe and South Africa is likely to remain close to average. Informal and formal
 maize exports to Malawi will continue. Similarly, the trade of food and nonfood items with Zimbabwe will be normal. The
 demand for South African processed foods and some agricultures products will remain high in urban and peri-urban areas
 of Mozambique.
- Following the end of the State of Public Calamity and the lifting of most COVID-19 restrictions, many poor families are increasing their engagement in petty-trade and casual labor opportunities for income. However, increases in fuel,

transport, and bread prices following the start of the conflict in Ukraine are limiting household purchasing power, particularly in the urban and peri urban areas where reliance on transportation and bread as a staple food are high. With reduced purchasing power, many poor urban and peri-urban families will likely increase their consumption of cassava, sweet potato, and yams and opt for cheaper forms of transportation.

- From June to August, agricultural labor activities only occur in areas with a second season crop production. Agricultural
 labor opportunities are likely to gradually increase and remain close to average with the onset of the rainy season in
 October/November 2022. Nationally, agricultural wages are also likely to be close to average. However, in areas affected
 by drought, tropical storms/cyclones, and conflict, agricultural labor opportunities and wages will remain below average
 due to below-average household liquidity to pay laborers.
- Second season production through September is likely to be average to above average, driven by average to aboveaverage rainfall in April and May 2022, improving residual soil moisture. As a result, the 2022/2023 main agricultural season is likely to be average, supported by the rainfall forecast.
- From June to September 2022, households typically engage in non-agricultural labor opportunities to earn income. In
 areas affected by shocks, households are likely to increase their reliance on petty trade and the sale of services for
 income. Increased competition will likely result in below normal income. From October 2022 until January 2013, rural
 households will likely enage in agricultural labor activities such as land preparation, planting, and weeding.
- Based on FEWS NET price projections, maize grain prices stabilize atypically through the projection period. Above-average prices in Maputo, Chókwe and other southern markets are likely due to the below-average availability of locally produced maize grain in the south and rising transportation and transaction costs from higher production areas. In most monitored markets, maize grain prices are likely to remain above the five-year average and either above, below, or similar to prices last year. As typical, maize meal and rice prices are likely to remain more stable than bulk grain prices; but short-term variations will drive localized supply and demand dynamics.
- Household food availability will remain close to average. However, in the southern semiarid areas, and shock-affected parts of central and

Figure 2. Maputo maize grain prices and projections (MZN/kg)



Source: FEWS NET Estimates based on MADER/SIMA data

northern regions household food stocks are expected to be significantly below average due to the poor harvest and/or crop failure during the 2021/2022 main agricultural season.

- The availability of wild foods is likely to be average throughout the country.
- Rangeland resources and livestock body conditions will remain average through the scenario period, driving close to
 average livestock prices. In drought-affected areas, favorable grazing and watering conditions are expected following
 average rainfall in April and May, reducing travel distances.
- From October 2022 to January 2023, as the new agricultural season starts, average rainfall will likely result in typical pest damage. However, dry spells may result in increased pest damage from fall armyworm (FAW), grasshoppers, stalk borer, leaf miner, and rodents.
- In Cabo Delgado, insurgents will continue to evade capture and launch attacks on poorly secured villages occasionally. The likelihood of high impact, high casualty attacks in urban centers will remain low amid the continued presence of counter-insurgency security forces. It is likely that the number of violent incidents carried out against civilian populations will continue to increase, likely reaching levels observed in 2021 during the dry months from May to October 2022.

- The return of IDPs to their origin is gradually happening, but most IDPs will remain in the relocation sites, temporary sites, or host community extensions. Due to limited crop production from the 2021/22 agricultural season and with basic livelihoods disrupted, the IDPs will remain dependent on emergency humanitarian assistance to fill gaps in food consumption.
- WFP will likely continue providing rations equivalent to 39 percent of daily kilocalories through September for the IDPs in northern Mozambique. However, WFP is warning that there is a potential pipeline break in October, even with a continuation with half rations, if additional funding is not secured soon. WFP expects to move towards prioritized targeting of the most vulnerable populations, including IDPs and host communities, once the Vulnerability Based Targeting exercise is finalized in the last quarter of 2022. For the drought-affected areas in the south, there are still no plans for humanitarian food assistance from the WFP.

Most Likely Food Security Outcomes

From June to September, most poor households will continue to access food from their own production and will continue to experience None (IPC Phase 1) outcomes. However, in most areas in central Mozambique, despite accessing, delayed harvests and some second season and post-flood production, very poor households are likely to remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) as they typically are more vulnerable to acute food insecurity after successive shocks. However, in the inland areas of Gaza and Inhambane provinces and southern Manica and Sofala provinces, where main season production was severely affected by below-average rainfall and unusually high temperatures, poor households will intensify their typical livelihoods strategies. Still, the poorest households, who have few or no livestock and little to no capacity to produce charcoal, are likely to reduce spending on non-food items and adopt consumption-based coping strategies. These strategies include skipping meals, reducing the size of meals, consuming less preferred food varieties, and increasing the consumption of wild foods to minimize food consumption gaps. In July, household food security is likely to deteriorate as low or no food stocks, high market demand, and limited access to income results in the poorest households with limited resources engaging in more severe survival strategies. These strategies include withdrawing children from school- unless meals are provided- or sending family members to eat elsewhere. An increasing number of poor households will require emergency food assistance to avoid the depletion of essential livelihood assets, leading to area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes well before the start of the lean season in October/November. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will start emerging in the Ilha de Moçambique, Mogincual and Mossuril districts in Nampula province due to limited access to food, limited income-earning opportunities, and the weakening capacity of host communities to support the severely storm/cyclone and flood-affected households. The most affected poor households will be unable to recover food stocks through post-flood production due to a lack of seeds and limited labor opportunities for income. In Cabo Delgado, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will prevail in conflict affected areas, driven by the spread of conflict to new areas by small groups of insurgents. Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) are expected in areas where humanitarian partners have access and food distribution is more regular.

From October 2022 to January 2023, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will likely prevail in drought-affected areas as poor households will continue to experience deficits in food consumption due to increasingly challenging market access to food driven by higher-than-average food prices. The poorest households, without livestock to sell and without the ability to produce and sell charcoal, are likely to intensify their engagement in coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3), such as reducing the amount of food or the number of meals, increasing their consumption of wild foods, sending one or more family members to relatives in other locations, and even migrating to places with more income-generating opportunities, including areas along the main corridors for the production and sale of charcoal. The start of the rains, typically in November, is likely to increase agricultural labor opportunities such as land preparation and planting. However, agricultural labor wages in drought affected areas are likely to be lower than typical due to lower payment power of middle and better-off households following below-normal crop sales from the 2021/22 season. In Nampula, the depletion of food reserves much earlier than usual and the reduction of the capacity for mutual support could result in more districts facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, including Liúpo, Meconta, and Monapo. In addition, the lack of adequate response by humanitarian actors can result in increased demand for areas with greater employment opportunities, such as artisanal mines or urban. Rising Inflationprojected to continue to increase due to the impact of rising fuel and wheat prices internationally- will limit very poor household purchasing power, particularly in urban and peri-urban areas, forcing them to continue readjusting their expenses and reducing access to certain non-food items in favor of staple foods. In areas affected by conflict, continued displacement is likely to limit access to income-earning opportunities and the ability of households to engage in the agricultural season, driving Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes and keeping humanitarian assistance needs high.

EVENTS THAT MIGHT CHANGE THE OUTLOOK

Table 1. Possible events over the next eight months that could change the most-likely scenario.

Area	Event	Impact on food security outcomes
National	Moderate to severe flooding	Severe flooding in January 2023 would negatively affect poor households located in major river basins, particularly in the northern regions, but also along the coast, and the Lower Zambezi and Limpopo rivers. Depending on the magnitude of the flood, poor households will their lose maize, homes, food stocks, and assets. Impacted households will likely need humanitarian food assistance for at least three to four months until the post-flood crops are harvested in April/May 2023.
National	Delay in the start of the rains and the start of the agricultural season	A delayed start to the agricultural season will delay agricultural labor opportunities including land preparation, planting, and weeding. This would limit household access to income and reduce household purchasing power at a time when food prices typically increase due to increased demand.
Coastal Areas	Cyclones and floods striking the coastal areas of Mozambique	The risk of cyclones and floods is through March 2023. Worst affected households will likely face food gaps until they recover through post-shock production beyond the scenario period.


AREAS OF CONCERN

Southern Semiarid Cereals and Cattle (Livelihood Zone 22)

Current Situation

Although La Niña is typically related to above-average precipitation in southern Africa, the 2021/2022 rainy season performed poorly in southern Mozambique, with prolonged dry spells in February and early March during critical crop growth stages that resulted in widespread crop failure (Figure 4). This marks a fourth below-average season in five years, following the three-year drought from 2017-2020, that was alleviated by last year's above-average harvest. Following the poor to failed harvest in May 2022, very poor and poor household food reserves are very low or exhausted as stocks from the above-average 2020/2021 season were exhausted during the past lean season. According to a Household Economy Analysis carried out by FEWS NET in May 2022, which uses information on crop production, prices, and other sources to understand households' access to food and income relative to typical requirements, very poor rural households will face survival deficits (meaning they will likely be unable to meet all their

Figure 3. Reference Map for Southern Semiarid Cereals and Cattle Livelihood Zone



Source: FEWS NET


food and essential non-food needs) through the scenario period. On average, very poor households will face survival deficits equivalent to about 5 percent of their annual food and income needs between June 2022 and January 2023 and will not meet their livelihood protection needs, affecting their short to medium-term production capacity (Figure 5)ⁱ. However, between October 2022 and January 2023, the survival deficit will increase to 20 percent, indicating moderate food consumption gaps due to the depletion of any remaining abandoned food stocks. During this time, households will likely be entirely dependent on market purchases with high staple food prices and increasing their consumption of wild foods, including *xicutsi* (roots of a

ⁱ Despite relatively large seasonal deficits which are in line with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) level outcomes according to IPC definitions, a convergence of evidence approach is applied to determine the most likely area-level outcomes, and the majority of evidence concerning both contributing factors and outcomes points to smaller seasonal deficits than those reflected in the HEA outcome analysis.

local tree that are boiled with water and taken as tea). During this period very poor household income will be well below average as they will not be able to sell food from their production, and income generation opportunities will be limited due to increased competition. Overall, most very poor households are expected to face moderate food consumption gaps, with limited access to income for market purchases.


Currently, households are employing livelihood and food consumption coping strategies including spending savings, provide services in exchange for food, consuming seed stocks that were to be saved for the next season, and the excessive consumption of less preferred and nonrecommended wild foods to minimize food consumption gaps. In remote areas within the zone, very poor households that are able to sell chickens or produce charcoal for sale, are facing difficulty accessing markets, which can be located up to 50 km away, due to the high fuel and transportation costs. The current income earned from agricultural work by very poor households is estimated by key informants to be around 50 to 75 percent of average due to below average payment power by the middle and better-off households due to crop loss in the 2021/2022 main season and ongoing recovery from the effects of three consecutive poor harvests from 2017 to 2020 on food stocks and household income and savings. Usually, poor households do not sell chickens at this time of the year, but poor households are now selling them to earn income to purchase food in local markets in order to fill food consumption gaps. Poor households are

Figure 4. Cumulative rainfall in Chibuto district, Gaza Province, July 2021-June 2022



Source: FEWS NET

Figure 5. Seasonal expenditure (food and cash) relative to needs for very poor households in Gaza district (Southern Semiarid Cereals and Cattle Livelihood Zone), April 2022- March 2023, according to HEA outcome analysis



Source: FEWS NET

also earning income through casual labor, including construction, and the production and sale of charcoal and clay bricks, firewood, thatch, local beverages, construction poles, and the cutting and selling of reeds (used in rural housing), handicrafts, and fetching water. However, increased competition in the same self-employment activities is likely reducing household access to income.

Assumptions

In addition to the National level assumptions, the following assumptions apply to this area of concern:

- With multiple planting, during the 2021/22 main season, very poor households have exhausted all or much of their seed stocks and are expected to have difficulty accessing seeds for the upcoming 2022/2023 main season.
- Since May, very poor households have been atypically intensifying their self-employment activities to above-average
 levels to earn income for food market purchases. Households are likely to continue relying on income from selfemployment activities to purchase food; however, due to increased competition household income will still be below
 average.
- Through the scenario period, very poor households, except the small proportion able to participate in the second season, are unlikely to have household food stocks until the 2022/23 harvest in March/April 2023. Households are expected to be dependent on market purchases for food.
- Through the scenario period, informal and formal trade flows from the central region are expected to atypically increase
 to take advantage of high prices southern Mozambique. However, overall maize grain availability will remain below
 average through January 2023 and likely until the harvest in March 2023.

Most Likely Food Security Outcomes

From June to September 2022, an increasing number of very poor households will begin to face food consumption gaps as their coping capacity becomes weaker. Most households will likely engage in self-employment activities to earn money for

food purchases. However, below-average income from increased competition and high food prices will constrain household purchasing power and food access from markets. An increasing number of very poor households are expected to start forgoing essential non-food needs during this period as they expand their coping capacities to meet their minimum food needs, including spend their savings, borrow money or food, purchase food on credit, reduce expenses on non-food items, sell more animals than expected (for those with animals), and provide services in exchange for food. An increasing number of very poor households will begin facing food consumption gaps, particularly in the interior areas of the livelihood zone, in

areas where the second agricultural season is not practiced, areas where the availability of wild food is low, and areas with limited opportunities for self-employment due to increased competition, lack of markets, and low demand. However, households will likely continue intensifying their typical income-generating activities. Migration to major urban cities and South Africa for casual labor opportunities will continue as possible. Still, migration will likely be below average due to reduced economic activity, the high cost of living, the cost of COVID-19 testing, and fear of xenophobia. From July and August onwards, the most affected poor households will start adopting harsher coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes such as sending a household member to eat elsewhere, increased consumption of wild foods such as *xicutsi* that are normally eaten later in the year, consume seed stocks, withdraw children from school, skip or reduce meals, and consume less preferred foods. In late July, household food consumption gaps are expected to increase, with area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes likely. Emergency food assistance will likely be required to minimize household food consumption gaps.

Figure 6. More households are producing and selling charcoal as observed in a rapid food security assessment by FEWS NET in the Southern Semiarid Cereals and Cattle Livelihood Zone



Source: FEWS NET

From October 2022 to January 2023, the 2022/2023 agricultural season is expected to begin along with the typical lean season. Forecasts indicate an increased likelihood of average to above-average rainfall, with a normal onset of rainfall. From October, most households will be involved in land clearing, and in November, households will likely start planting wherever adequate rainfall amounts allow. If households can access seeds, they are likely to maximize the area planted to re-build their food stocks and recover from the poor 2021/2022 agricultural season. Through the agricultural season, self-employment activities will be gradually replaced by farming activities, but seed availability will be influencing how much a household can plant. The start of the rains will also improve water availability and increase pasture, improving livestock body conditions. Although a normal start to the 2022/2023 agricultural season is likely to increase agricultural labor activities and household access to income, wages are likely to be below-average due to middle and better-off households having limited ability to pay via in-kind or cash following the poor 2021/2022 harvest and increased living costs. Very poor households are likely to continue engaging in self-employment activities to earn income and improve their purchasing power. Nonetheless, food consumption gaps are likely to increase as already higher than typical food prices increase seasonally. To fill food gaps, households will likely increase their consumption of wild foods; however, excessive consumption of wild foods, such as xicutsi for long periods of time, can lead to health problems, including acute malnutrition. Below-typical income from agricultural labor opportunities and self-employment activities is expected to severely impact household purchasing power, along with high maize grain and maize meal prices. Overall, area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected, with the worstaffected and most vulnerable population likely to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in the absence of humanitarian food assistance.

EVENTS THAT MIGHT CHANGE THE OUTLOOK

Table 3. Possible events over the next eight months that could change the most-likely scenario.

Area	Event	Impact on food security outcomes
Livelihood zone 22	Inadequate response by traders (undersupply of local markets as traders may opt to move their commodities elsewhere)	This will likely increase staple food prices and lead to greater food deficits for very poor and poor households and increase the number of people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. The most vulnerable who are currently facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) may start facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes as food gaps increase, particularly during the typical peak lean season (from November to February).
	Inadequate humanitarian assistance	An inadequate response to humanitarian assistance needs would mean a greater number of poorer households would face larger food gaps and a potential deterioration in acute malnutrition. There is the possibility that at the peak of the lean season, poorest households in an area such as Chigubo District and other interior parts of the zone could face even more severe outcomes than initially projected, that could lead to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes at household level.

North-Central Coastal Fishing (Livelihood Zone 08) – Subzone of coastal Nampula province

Current Situation

The North-Central Coastal Fishing Livelihood Zone, particularly the districts of Ilha de Moçambique, Liupo, Meconta, Mogincual, Monapo, and Mossuril were most affected by the Tropical Cyclone Gombe which made landfall on March 11 in Mossuril district, Nampula province. Cyclone Gombe hit Mozambique as a Category 3 cyclone with heavy rains (200mm/24h) and strong winds (150-230km/h). Cyclone Gombe also made landfall near where Tropical Storm Ana had struck only six weeks prior, which worsened the storm's lasting effects. In April 2022, FAO, in collaboration with the provincial government institutions and the Food Security Cluster (FSC), conducted a community level field assessment in Nampula, Zambezia, and Sofala to complement the efforts of the government and other FSC partners, and gain a more in-depth understanding of the damage and losses in the agricultural-based livelihoods. Overall, around 133,900 households were affected across the districts visited by the assessment, with over 83,100 households located in the six Nampula districts in the north-central coastal fishing livelihood zone. However, across Nampula province around 128,260 households were estimated to have been affected by Cyclone Gombe.

Figure 7. Reference Map for North-Central Coastal Fishing Livelihood Zone, Nampula province



Source: FEWS NET

Prior to Tropical Storm Ana and Cyclone Gombe, the 2021/2022 rainy and agricultural season was characterized by a late onset of rainfall (10-30 days), with the effective start of the season beginning in mid-to-late December. When Cyclone Gombe made landfall, crops were at vegetative to reproductive growth stages, and in good condition, but key informants reported that over 50 percent of planted crops were destroyed. Based on the Water Requirement Satisfaction Index (WRSI), crop conditions at the end of May were likely to have been average to good had it not been for the damage from the tropical storms and Cyclone Gombe. However, due to the destruction, the harvest is likely to be below-average.

Average to above-average rainfall in March and April provided favorable residual moisture for the second crop season which began in mid-May. However, crop production will depend on household seed stocks. The government is providing some assistance in cassava branches, but key informants report that it is still insufficient, and there is need for strengthening assistance for horticultural seeds.


Due to the loss of food stocks during the tropical storms and cyclone, and the below-average harvest, very poor household food reserves are expected to be exhausted in June 2022. In May, FEWS NET carried out a rapid Outcome Analysis (HEA) which uses information on crop production, prices, and other sources understand households access to food and income relative to typical requirementsⁱⁱ. From June September, very poor households are not expected to have a survival deficit but will be fully dependent on market

Figure 8. Pentadal rainfall in Mossuril district, Nampula Province, November 2021-June 2022 Rainfall (mm) Dec Jan Mean (2000-2018) 2021-2022 2021-2022 Prelim 2021-2022 GEF5 Source USGS/FEWS NET

purchases for food. From October 2022 to January 2023, the survival deficit is expected to increase to 18 percent, due to increased competition for labor opportunities likely limiting household access to income along with the likely seasonal increase in food prices, which will lower household purchasing power. However, based on field observations and key informants in the districts of Ilha de Moçambique, Mogincual and Mossuril, households are reporting that they do not have food reserves, that infrastructure remains damaged, and households are engaging in coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) such as eating one meal per day or skipping meals. Overall, it is likely that very poor households are in need of emergency food assistance to help cover food gaps.

Beside the late start of the rainfall, the zone also experienced some dry spells in February and March which affected crop production. According to key informants, rice production is estimated to be near-normal, while the production of sweet

Figure 9. Seasonal expenditure (food and cash) relative to needs for very poor households in Nampula district (Nort-Central Coastal Fishing Livelihood Zone), April 2022-March 2023, according to HEA outcome analysis



Source: FEWS NET

potatoes, coconuts, cassava, and beans are likely to be around 70-75 percent of normal. Sesame, a cash crop, is expected to be around 40 percent of normal. The drop in production is expected to reduce household food access especially later in the lean season from October to January. Households are also reportedly increasing their consumption of wild foods to fill food consumption gaps.

Assumptions

In addition to the national level assumptions, the following assumptions apply to this area of concern:

- Very poor households are likely to have difficulty accessing seeds for the ongoing second season and for the upcoming 2022/2023 main agricultural season. Very poor households are likely to depend on support from the government or humanitarian organizations for agriculture inputs.
- · Based on FEWS NET's integrated price projections, maize grain prices will remain relatively stable or slightly decrease in June and then increase towards the peak in February. During the scenario period, maize grain prices will remain above last year and the five-year average.

Most Likely Food Security Outcomes

From June to September 2022, households will likely begin exhausting their food stocks in July 2022. An increasing number of very poor households will likely begin facing food consumption gaps in August and September as households increasingly rely on market purchases, and their capacity to engage in consumption and livelihood coping strategies weakens. Most of the

ii Seasonal deficits are in line with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) level outcomes according to IPC definitions; however, a convergence of evidence approach is applied to determine the most likely area-level outcomes, and the majority of evidence concerning both contributing factors and outcomes points to smaller seasonal deficits than those reflected in the HEA outcome analysis.

households are expected to be consume cassava, maize meal, rice, fish and vegetables but with less frequency and quantity than normal. Access to income is likely to be difficult due to the lack of agricultural work opportunities as the main agricultural season has ended. Additionally, wealthier households are unlikely to hire additional labor as they have lost their basic livelihood assets including food reserves, livestock, working tools, and fishing equipment, and will need some time to recover. This is likely to increase reliance on self-employment, including the sale of forest products and production and sale of charcoal, but income is expected to be low due to low demand. Additionally, high staple food prices in local markets, combined with below-average income is likely to significantly reduce the purchasing power of very poor households. In the most affected districts, particularly Ilha de Moçambique, Mogincual, and Mossuril, where most of the poorest households lost almost everything, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to begin emerging in August and September.


From October 2022 to January 2023, the start of the forecast average rainy season in November/December will increase agricultural labor opportunities, although in-kind and cash payments to very poor and poor households are likely to be below-average due to middle and better-off households having less liquidity and stocks following losses from the tropical storms/cyclone and increasing costs of living, which is reducing household purchasing power. During this time, an increasing number of very poor households will exhaust their food reserves. Very poor households are likely to continue engaging in casual labor and self-employment activities to earn money for market purchases. Additionally, very poor households will likely supplement their diet with wild foods to minimize food consumption gaps. However, high staple food prices are expected to strain household purchasing power and reduce very poor household access to market purchases. The decline in food access will likely increase acute malnutrition rates as very poor households face food consumption gaps. At the beginning of the peak of the lean season in December 2022, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely to expand to other districts including Liúpo, Meconta, and Monapo as more poor households will face difficulty accessing food following the exhaustion of their food reserves and limited access to income. However, should significant humanitarian food assistance occur, it is likely that poor households with access to assistance could face Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) until the 2022/2023 harvest in March 2023..

EVENTS THAT MIGHT CHANGE THE OUTLOOK

Table 3. Possible events over the next eight months that could change the most-likely scenario.

Area	Event	Impact on food security outcomes
Livelihood Zone 08, Nampula province	Flooding or cyclone	Flooding from a large storm or a cyclone in January 2023 will likely result in crop and livelihood asset losses. The loss of consecutive harvests and the inability to recover from past losses is likely to result in an a higher number of people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.
	Significant access to HFA	If significant food assistance is provided to most very poor and poor households, area-level Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are likely to occur in October 2022-January 2023.


SEASONAL CALENDAR FOR A TYPICAL YEAR




Source: FEWS NET

MOST LIKELY FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES AND AREAS RECEIVING SIGNIFICANT LEVELS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE*

Each of these maps adheres to IPC v3.0 humanitarian assistance mapping protocols and flags where significant levels of humanitarian assistance are being/are expected to be provided. indicates that at least 25 percent of households receive on average 25–50 percent of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance (HFA). indicates that at least 25 percent of households receive on average over 50 percent of caloric needs through HFA. This mapping protocol differs from the (!) protocol used in the maps at the top of the report. The use of (!) indicates areas that would likely be at least one phase worse in the absence of current or programmed humanitarian assistance.




Projected food security outcomes, June to September 2022



Source: FEWS NET

Projected food security outcomes, October 2022 to January 2023



FEWS NET classification is IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners.

FEWS NET: Mozambique Food Security Outlook June 2022 to January 2023: Crisis (IPC Phase 3) likely to persist through early 2023 with needs projected to remain high, 2022

ABOUT SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT

To project food security outcomes, FEWS NET develops a set of assumptions about likely events, their effects, and the probable responses of various actors. FEWS NET analyzes these assumptions in the context of current conditions and local livelihoods to arrive at a most likely scenario for the coming eight months. Learn more here.