

General Elections 15 Oct 2019 Final Report

Frelimo landslide questioned

Nyusi wins 73%, Frelimo gains 184 seats in AR

Frelimo and President Filipe Nyusi swept away the opposition in the 15 October 2019 general elections, matching Armando Guebuza's 2009 landslide. But there were widespread reports of misconduct.

On a 52% turnout, Nyusi won 73% of the vote with over 50% in all provinces. Frelimo won majorities in all provincial parliaments and in the first ever election of governors, Frelimo won all ten.

Frelimo won 184 seats in parliament (AR, Assembleia da República) which is not enough to change the constitution before 2023. To amend the constitution less than five years after the previous amendment (12 June 2018) requires a three-quarters majority (188 seats) but after that only a two thirds majority (167 seats), so Frelimo will be able to amend the constitution in 2023 and 2024. (Constitution art 301, 303)

But there was heavy criticism of the election. Electoral management bodies were much more partisan than in the past, and their misconduct was much more blatant than in previous elections. For example, election officials registered over 300,000 more voters than the 2017 population census said there were adults of voting age in Gaza. And in a total violation of the law, election officials refused to give credential to more than 3000 domestic observers who were supposed to carry out the parallel vote tabulation (PVT). Even the Comissão Nacional de Eleições (National Elections Commission, CNE) violated the law.

Secrecy and limitations on observation make it difficult to quantify the fraud, but the most gross misconduct which could be identified from public data inflated Nyusi's victory by more than half a million votes and took 5 parliament (AR) seats from Renamo. This is detailed on page 13 of this report.

Observer criticism

"The elections were not free, fair and transparent and the results are not credible," concluded 8 major civil society observer groups.

There were "irregularities" in the counting of votes "jeopardizing the transparency of the electoral process," said two judges of the Constitutional Council, adding that "the irregularities that have occurred in these elections are an inherent consequence of the organization, administration and management of our electoral processes."

"An unlevel playing field was evident" and there was a "climate of fear", said the European Union in preliminary statements. It cited "a lack of confidence that the electoral administration and the judiciary were independent and free from political influence" and a distrust of the police. The EU had "doubts about the quality of voter register". It added that "counting often lacked adherence to established procedures."

"US Embassy election observers witnessed a number of irregularities and vulnerabilities [including a] lack of rigor applied to the district-level tabulation process. ... These examples raise questions about the integrity of these procedures and their vulnerability to possible fraudulent acts."

The CC judgement is on <http://bit.ly/CCAc25-Corr-2> and the observer reports are on <https://www.cipeleicoes.org/documentos/>.

Lack of transparency was a particular problem, with small and large decisions taken in secret and not announced or explained; vote tabulation was largely secret. Without noting that it had done so and without explanation, when the CNE announced its results on 27 October 2019 it excluded 144,918 votes. When the CNE results were confirmed

virtually unchanged by the Conselho Constitucional (Constitutional Council, CC) on 23 December the vote exclusion was not mentioned - then, in secret, the CC corrected the mistake for the presidential vote, but not for the parliamentary vote, which it later corrected in a second secret change.

CNE & CC exclude diaspora vote, then CC secretly changes results twice

Official results announced by the CNE on 27 October and approved by the CC on 22 December excluded 144,918 presidential votes and 144,934 parliamentary (Assembleia da República, AR) votes which are included in the tables published by the CNE and CC.

To add to the confusion, the voter registration is the same in the official results and table - only the votes have been excluded. The exclusion is nowhere mentioned or justified, but analysis of the tables suggests that the CNE excluded the votes, but not the registration, of Mozambicans in the diaspora.

To compound the confusions, after this Bulletin and AIM reported this error, the CC in secret changed its ruling (acórdão 25) for the Presidential vote, but not for the parliamentary vote. After this Bulletin reported the continued error with AR votes, the CC made a second secret change.

Mozambicans abroad can register and vote for president and parliament, with 1 AR seat for Africa and 1 for Europe. Registration totals include those in the diaspora, and there were 144,918 voters in the diaspora who, it appears, did not have their votes counted.

There seem two possible explanations. The first is simple error. At district and national level, vote tabulation is done in secret by the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral - STAE) and then accepted by election commissions, usually without much discussion. It had been pointed out to STAE that some of its earlier reports had included diaspora registration but not other diaspora data. Thus a STAE error may simply have been rubber-stamped by the CNE and CC because the high level of secrecy meant that parties, observers and journalists were never able to check the numbers before approval.

The alternative explanation is that registration of the diaspora in Africa was clearly inflated, as was registration in Gaza (see page 15). STAE or the CNE may have decided in secret that excluding the diaspora vote was a way of compensating for this form of ballot box stuffing. This is possible, because CNE President Sheik Abul Carimo told the Elections Bulletin that to control gross ballot box stuffing, district elections commissions had been instructed to exclude any polling stations with turnouts of over 100%, but this instruction was never published and no such exclusions were ever reported. This also occurred in secret in past elections.

Presidential election	Official Results, CNE, CC Acórdão 25 original page 31		Results from CC Acórdão 25, changed page 31		Not counted
Registered	13 162 321		13 162 321		0
Voters	6 679 008	50.74%	6 823 926	51.84%	144 918
Valid votes	6 174 713		6 315 605		140 892
Candidate					
Nyusi	4 507 549	73.00%	4 639 172	73.46%	131 623
Simango	270 615	4.38%	273 599	4.33%	2 984
Momade	1 351 284	21.88%	1 356 786	21.48%	5 502
Albino	45 265	0.74%	46 048	0.73%	783
Parliament election	Official Results, CNE, CC Acórdão 25 both versions page 32		Results from CC Acórdão 25, both versions pages 102-4		Not counted
Registered	13 162 321		13 162 321		0
Voters	6 621 482	50.31%	6 766 416	51.41%	144 934
Valid votes	5 926 818		6 065 521		128 703
Parties					
Frelimo	4 195 072	70.78%	4 323 298	71.28%	128 226
MDM	251 347	4.24%	254 290	4.19%	2 943
Renamo	1 346 009	22.71%	1 351 659	22.28%	5 650

STAE and CNE have always claimed that the elections laws allow them to change results in secret, without reporting the changes.

The Elections Bulletin (87, 27 Oct) did headline the excluded vote when it was announced by the CNE, but this seems not to have been noted by the CC, which also failed to note that its official results (page 31 of the original version of Acórdão 25) did not agree with the table (page 111 of Acórdão 25) in the 449 page annex to the ruling.

The original ruling, signed by the 7 constitutional council justices, was distributed at a public ceremony on 22 December and posted on the CC website. By early January a new version of the ruling, still called "Acórdão no, 25/CC/2019, de 22 de Dezembro" and with no indication of a change, had been posted with the tables of presidential

results on page 31 corrected but not those on page 32 for the AR. A week later, a new Acórdão 25 appeared on the CC website changing page 32.

The original version of Acórdão 25 is posted on our website on <http://bit.ly/CCAc25-Orig>, the first secretly corrected version on <http://bit.ly/CCAc25-Corr-1> and the second secretly corrected version on <http://bit.ly/CCAc25-Corr-2>

By including the registration of all voters but then excluding the votes of the diaspora - 144,918 votes - this reduced the turnout from 51.8% to 50.7%. It also took 131,623 votes away from Nyusi. The table on previous page compares the original "official" results to those in the annex of the CC 23 December ruling. All data and tables in this Election Bulletin final report use the numbers from the annex to the CC ruling and incorporate both the diaspora registration and its votes.

Another 2nd term landslide

Filipe Nyusi won his second term as president with a landslide almost as large as Armando Guebuza's second term victory a decade ago. But, as we note in the remainder of this report, there were more reports


of serious misconduct than in any previous elections. Guebuza in 2009 won 75% of the vote and Frelimo 191 seats in parliament (AR), while in 2019 Nyusi won 73% and Frelimo 184 seats.

In all elections the main opponent was Renamo, which had been the guerrilla movement fighting the government in the 1981-92 war.

Renamo did best in 1999, with 48% of the presidential votes and 117 seats in the AR, and did worst in 2004 with only 16% of the presidential votes and just 51 seats in parliament. Until his death in 2018, Afonso Dhlakama was the only Renamo presidential candidate, and he raised his vote to 37% in 2014 against Nyusi, and Renamo gained 89 seats in the AR. In this election, Renamo head Ossufo Momade with 21% of the vote and 60 AR seats did worse than Dhlakama in 2014 but slightly better than him in 2009,

The third presidential candidate in the past three

Presidential vote in six elections



elections has been MDM head and Beira mayor Daviz Simango. His vote has been stable at about 300,000 which means it is falling in percentage terms (from 9% to 4%) as the electorate grows.

Each presidential candidate must present 10,000 notarised signatures of registered voters to the Constitutional Council (CC).

On 31 July the CC accepted four candidates but rejected three because of false signatures.

Accepted were candidates of the three main parties - Filipe Nyusi (Frelimo), Ossufo Momade (Renamo) and Daviz Simango (MDM), as well as one small party candidate, Mário Albino of AMUSI, a Nampula-based party that broke away from MDM.

Rejected were candidacies of Alice Mabota, former head of the Human Rights League standing for CAD, Hélder Mendonça of Podemos, and Eugénio Estêvão, General Secretary of MAMO.

Parliament seats in six elections

Partidos	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014	2019
Frelimo	129	133	160	191	144	184
Renamo	112	117	90	51	89	60
MDM				8	17	6
UD	9					

The CC pointed to "blatant evidence that signatures had been signed by the same hand" and in some cases "proponent voter registration cards displaying a numerical sequence of voter cards, which leads to the assumption that they are merely copies of voter registration books."

Alice Mabota initially had 688 signatures by the same person, 1091 people who signed her forms

more than once, and 4,164 with invalid or impossible registration numbers.

Helder Mandonça submitted 12,250 signatures of which 4,147 were invalid.

Eugénio Estêvão submitted 11,340 signatures of which 7,732 were invalid, including 5,360 clearly signed by the same person.

Presidential vote in six elections

Candidates	1994		1999		2004		2009		2014		2019***	
	mn	% of valid	mn	% of valid	mn	% of valid	mn	% of valid	mn	% of valid	mn	% of valid
Chissano	2.6	53%	2.3	52%								
Guebuza					2.0	64%	3.0	75%				
Nyusi									2.8	57%	4.6	73%
Dhlakama	1.7	34%	2.1	48%	1.0	32%	0.6	16%	1.8	37%		
Momade											1.4	21%
Simango							0.3	9%	0.3	6%	0.3	4%
Others	0.6	13%			0.1	4%					0.04	1%
		% of total		% of total		% of total		% of total		% of total		% of total
Nulos	0.2	2.8%	0.1	2.9%	0.1	2.9%	0.2	4.0%	0.2	3.2%	0.2	3.3%
Brancos	0.3	5.8%	0.3	6.5%	0.1	2.9%	0.3	6.0%	0.3	5.4%	0.3	4.2%
Total	5.4		*5.3		3.3		4.4		5.3		6.8	
Turnout		88%		*74%		**43%		45%		49%		52%

* Estimated, to correct for 7% of polling stations excluded from the count (1999).

** Estimated, to correct for register book errors and polling stations excluded from count (2004).

*** Complete numbers from tables attached to Constitutional Council ruling; official numbers in the original version of Acórdão 25 excluded the diaspora vote (2019).

In 1994 there were 10 small party presidential candidates; in 2004 Raul Domingos gained 2.7% and 2 minor party candidates gained 1.8%; in 2019 there was one minor party candidate.

Frelimo wins all districts

Frelimo received the most votes in all of the 154 districts that had Provincial Assembly (Assembleia Provincial, AP) elections (there are no provincial assemblies in Maputo city and the diaspora). In 148 districts, Frelimo won more than 55% of the vote. The six where Frelimo did worst were:

- **Angonia**, Tete: Frelimo 47.96%, MDM 4.99% Renamo 47.05%. The difference between Frelimo and Renamo was only 0.90%, which is 825 votes. The high level of nulos (invalid votes, 6.37%) and blank votes (7.41%) suggests that a significant number of opposition ballot papers were spoiled or incorrectly called blank, and thus that Renamo may have won Angonia district.
- **Beira**, Sofala: F 48.25%, M 31.34%, R 20.11%
- **Nacala-Porto**, Nampula: F 49.14%, M 1.79%, R 48.29%
- **Buzi**, Sofala: F 50.47%, M 10.93%, R 37.58%
- **Mechanhelas**, Niassa: F 53.66%, M 5.64%, R 40.70%
- **Quelimane**, Zambézia, F 54.01%, M 4.85%, R 41.14%

Comparing 2018 municipal and 2019 AP elections in 3 Nampula cities

Nampula City	Registered	Voters	Valid	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Amusi	other	Turn-out	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Amusi	other
2018	342 463	203 742	196 230	63 167	12 221	116 602	2 177	2 043	59.5%	32.2%	6.2%	59.4%	1.1%	1.0%
2019	416 386	210 432	203 770	122 533	8 500	70 159	2 578		50.5%	62.4%	4.3%	35.8%	1.3%	
Difference	73 923	6 690	7 540	59 366	- 3 721	- 46 443	401	- 2 043						
% change	21.6%	3.3%	3.8%	94.0%	-30.4%	-39.8%								
Nacala Porto	Registered	Voters	Valid	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Amusi	other	Turn-out	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Amusi	other
2018	144 369	88 259	80 190	32 489	2 247	43 810	1 265	399	61.1%	40.5%	2.8%	54.6%	1.6%	0.5%
2019	151 403	80 200	74 151	36 440	1 351	35 810	570		53.0%	49.1%	1.8%	48.3%	0.8%	
Difference	7 034	- 8 059	- 6 039	3 951	- 896	- 8 000	- 695	- 399						
% change	4.9%	-9.1%	-7.5%	12.2%	-39.9%	-18.3%								
Ilha de Moçambique	Registered	Voters	Valid	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Amusi		Turn-out	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Amusi	
2018	32 029	17 010	15 017	5 942	1 803	7 630	269		53.1%	39.6%	12.0%	50.8%	1.8%	
2019	36 012	18 821	17 337	9 962	309	6 899	167		52.3%	57.5%	1.8%	39.8%	1.0%	
Difference	3 983	1 811	2 320	4 020	- 1 494	- 731	- 102							
% change	12.4%	10.6%	15.4%	67.7%	-82.9%	-9.6%								

What happened in Nampula?

In municipal elections in 2018, Renamo won 5 of 7 municipalities in Nampula province, and would have expected to do well in general elections of 2019, but instead it lost all districts.

Three municipalities have the same boundaries as districts, so it is possible to compare municipal elections and provincial assembly elections. In all three most people registered in 2018 and additional people registered in 2019. In all three, Renamo's vote decreased significantly between the two elections.

Ilha da Moçambique is Renamo head Ossufo Momade's birthplace and he would expect to do well, yet Renamo lost by a significant margin. Renamo's vote was down by 10%, but MDM and Amusi votes seem to have gone to Frelimo as well as many newly registered voters.

In Nampula city turnout was down and Renamo lost a catastrophic 40% of its vote, while Frelimo doubled its vote.

In Nacala Porto total vote was down; combined Renamo and other opposition vote fell by more than 9000 while Frelimo vote was up by 4000 - enough to allow Frelimo to squeak through with a 600 vote margin. There had been tension in Nacala Porto during the campaign. At least 23 people were

injured and two homes partially burned, including the house of a Frelimo secretary, in a fight in the Matalane neighbourhood between Frelimo and Renamo supporters on 19 September. After the polls closed on 15 October, Renamo supporters did not trust the count and gathered outside some polling stations. One person was killed, shot and beaten by the police, and four people were shot in the lower limbs as police tried to disperse the crowd at Sao Vicente de Paulo Secondary School, Nacala-Porto, at about 20h00. At Naherenque primary school, Mocone, Nacala-Porto, Nampula, voters stoned the polling station.

Renamo made official protests that polling station staff in both Nacala and Ilha de Moçambique invalidated ballot papers for Renamo by adding extra marks to make it look like the voter had voted for more than one candidate. The protests were rejected by the courts, along with many others, because they were submitted more than 48 hours after the count, or for lack of evidence.

Detailed results are not public

Results from each individual polling station are compiled by STAE, but they are no longer made public. Polling-station by polling-station results for 1994 were published in thick books.

For 1999 a CD was distributed (but with data only by polling centre such as a school, not by individual polling station.) For 2004 a CD with results for each polling station was distributed widely during the 2009 elections. But from then on,

the results were increasingly kept secret, although detailed results for 1994-2014 elections are posted on a special Bulletin website: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

For 2009, a similar CD was produced five years after the election, but was not given to Mozambicans and only given to 2014 international observers (who gave this Bulletin a copy).

Why is this important?

Acting entirely in secret, and without ever reporting that they have done so, provincial elections commissions and the CNE do not count some polling stations. Sometimes there are unresolvable arithmetic errors on the results sheet (edital). In 1999 some results sheets had ink spilled over them. Some places such as Changara, Tete, are notorious for having every registered voter -

plus a few more - actually vote, and in some years Changara polling stations have been excluded. Furthermore, this is often done by STAE and not the actual election commission, which itself may not be told. And these exclusions are never reported in any official document. Few other democracies would allow polling stations to be excluded in secret.

But five years after the election, when the CD became available, it was possible to compare polling stations on the CD with those on the official list of five years before, to see which ones had been left out. But, now, even the CD is secret.

Our election reporting

From 1994, the **Mozambique Political Process Bulletin** has reported all of Mozambique's multiparty elections, and for the 2019 general elections we published daily in key periods. The Bulletin has developed a system of local correspondents across the country. For the 2019 general elections we had 463 correspondents, of whom 235 worked for community radios, 76 were from civil society, and 56 were teachers. All districts in Mozambique were covered by at least two correspondents, many of whom had worked for us in previous elections, including the 2018 municipal elections.

All correspondents received special training, which stressed verification and neutrality. Verification means that any report must be confirmed - by checking with police, witnesses or other sources. We assume (and hope) that all of our correspondents vote, but stress that correspondents cannot take a campaign role for any candidate.

Impartiality and neutrality are key. Our editorial team in Maputo was in regular contact with correspondents to ensure accuracy. We were also able to use our correspondents to conduct rapid surveys, for example during registration our check on reported problems with solar panels used for registration computers led to the discovery that some had incompatible transformers and some did not.

Our team are both observers and journalists and our publisher, CIP, is a registered observer group. International rules for domestic observers do not exclude journalists, but require that any publication must be central and published by the registered observer group, which is precisely what we do, publishing the Bulletin.

For the first time the Bulletin also did a twice weekly broadcast on 50 community radio stations in 7 languages: Portuguese, Changana, Chisena, Lomwe, Nyungue, Emakhua and Kimuane. Most stations used the broadcasts in Portuguese and at least one local language.

Half of community radios are run by the government under ICS (Instituto de Comunicação Social, Institute of Social Communication) and many of our correspondents work or volunteer for

Web links

Past issues of the Bulletin and important documents are posted on the web:

Daily newsletters:

2019 English <http://bit.ly/GenEI2019>

2019 Portuguese and key documents

<https://www.cipeleicoes.org/>

2018 English <http://bit.ly/LocEI2018>

2018 Portuguese <http://bit.ly/EIAutar2018>

2013-14 English and Portuguese

<http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

Mozambique Political Process Bulletin

1993-2020 with reports on all elections,

English. <http://bit.ly/MPPB-En> and 1995-

2020, Portuguese, <http://bit.ly/BPPM-Pt>

Detailed elections results

All elections 1999-2014. <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

ICS. For the first time, at national level, on 11 September 2019 ICS Director-General, Farida Abdula, issued a circular stating that ICS staff are barred from engaging in outside journalism and observation activities. She made clear that community radio staff are civil servants or agents of the state. In some provinces it was just an informal threat to push correspondents to stop working of the bulletin. Only Niassa ICS actually attempted to dismiss people - largely volunteers because government-employed journalists are covered by a special clause in the constitution which says "the State guarantees the exemption of the public sector media as well as the independence of journalists

from the Government, the administration and other political powers." (art 48) ICS also refused to accept the Bulletin broadcasts without censoring them first, which we could not accept.

Credentials were a serious problem. Zambézia Provincial Election Commission (CPE) refused to issue credentials to Bulletin correspondents, but CIP was able to obtain them from CNE in Maputo.

Another problem in some places was that CPEs made "mistakes" with the credentials, assigning the journalists to other districts than the one they requested, and some were unable to report. However, compared to the widespread obstruction of observation, MPPB correspondents had relatively few problems.

What went wrong?

Increased misconduct puts elections in question

"Despite the guarantees for the transparency of the electoral process, some say that our electoral processes suffer from problems. After all, where do the problems of our electoral processes lie?" asked the Constitutional Council in its ruling approving the 2019 general elections (Acórdão 25). Are the problems legal, organizational and administrative, or preparations of parties and candidates asks the CC. "Or all these elements of the system taken together? It is therefore essential to reflect on these aspects."

This section of the Mozambique Political Process Bulletin's final report is, in part, a response to the CC and a contribution to the debate the CC calls for. The CC puts great stress on the party dominance or what it calls the "party-ization of the organs which supervise the electoral process, from top to bottom" And 14 of the 37 pages of the ruling are devoted to a discussion of transparency and

observation. We agree that all three - party-ization, observation and transparency - are central to questions raised about this election.

To those we add the lack of an "audit trail", registration, ballot-box stuffing and other forms of Frelimo vote inflation, and an electoral administration above the law.

Party-ization prevents neutrality

"The Constitutional Council concludes that electoral legislation has created formal mechanisms to ensure the transparency of electoral processes, opting for the party-ization of the organs which supervise the electoral process, from top to bottom," says Acórdão 25. It stresses that "the declared objective of the legislators in party-izing the CNE, its supporting bodies, STAE and polling stations has been achieved."

Members of the CNE (Comissão Nacional de Eleições, National Elections Commission) and district and provincial elections commissions are named in proportion to party representation in parliament. Parties nominate deputy directors and technicians to the Election Technical Secretariat (STAE, Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral) at all levels. Each of the three parties in parliament names one member of each polling station staff. And all parties have party poll watchers (delegates) in each polling station.

Some election commission members are named by civil society organizations (CSOs), but instead of being neutral, they were selected from party aligned CSOs in the same proportion as party nominees. The gave the party of government, Frelimo, a majority on all electoral commissions.

The system was promoted by Renamo and particularly the late President Afonso Dhlakama, who took the view that Mozambique was so polarised that no one could be neutral, and therefore the best choice was to stuff the electoral system with Renamo supporters to keep watch. But it has proved counterproductive, for two reasons. First, Renamo could never find and train enough people to effectively participate and maintain a check on the system, which became particularly clear in 2018 and 2019. Second, it promoted the idea that everyone in the electoral system was there to benefit their party.

This second point is part of a much larger issue - the inheritance from the one-party state and from colonialism before that. In the 1975-90 period of a single party, there was no question of a "neutral"

civil service. Instead, the civil service was there to promote the interests of the ruling party, much as the previous civil service was expected to support the fascist Portuguese state, and civil servants were expected to be in Frelimo. With the arrival of the multi-party system many in the civil service, including police and STAE, still saw their role as to support the elected government of Frelimo. Senior officials initially all came from the one-party era and a Frelimo government controlled promotions.

Initially, Renamo did not want to change the system because it wanted that power when it was eventually elected. Party-ization of higher courts, the electoral system, and other bodies was accepted as a compromise. In the few years before his death, Dhlakama came to understand the problem and pushed unsuccessfully for a more neutral civil service. But the 2018 and 2019 elections saw the civil service - STAE, police, courts, education - pushed to be much more partisan. Faced with more blatant misconduct including intimidation and arrests, Renamo was unable to mount an effective challenge.

In 2012 Sheik Abdul Carimo, a key figure in the joint CSO Electoral Observatory, gave an interview to Canal de Moçambique in which he argued that "STAE and CNE are neither independent nor impartial." A year later he was named President of the CNE and initially tried to create some sense of neutrality and consensus.

But by the 2018 municipal elections this had failed completely, and votes in at least four municipalities were manipulated to prevent opposition victories. Opposition members of electoral commissions and STAE were simply bypassed and ignored, and were too weak and poorly trained to object effectively. In several municipalities, police were overtly supportive of Frelimo. Court challenges proved difficult because the Constitutional Council is similarly appointed on a party basis and judges and magistrates named by the government in power. The Ministry of Education and schools increasingly became a channel for party mobilisation.



Party-ization and misconduct in 2018 went unchallenged by the courts and the international community, so Frelimo felt safe to mobilise significant parts of the electoral administration for the 2019 general elections. Public statements never specifically called for misconduct, but often stressed that it was essential to win "at all costs". Decades in power has created a decentralised party structure in which senior party members take decisions locally because they feel they know what is expected of them.

Frelimo's electoral machine did, however, target two provinces, as we note below: Gaza to inflate the pro-Frelimo vote, and Zambézia to prevent the election of a dynamic Renamo governor.

Frelimo has created a "party machine" similar to US cities (1890s-1960s), Latin America, and Italy and Japan (1950s-1990s), based in part on political clientelism in which jobs, contracts and licences are dependent on support for a predominant party.

Party-ization was supported by both sides in parliament, but it has allowed the Frelimo machine to dominate the electoral administration. Many of the problems discussed below, from Gaza over-registration to denial of observer credentials to misconduct in the counting occurred because Frelimo was able to use party-ization and the opposition was not.

Observation constrained

The role of election observation is not negligible," says the CC (Acórdão 25). "Electoral observers are a mechanism that helps to increase the confidence of the national and international community in electoral processes, promoting transparency, citizen participation and the democratic conduct of elections"

Unquestionably observation has been important in all past multi-party elections in curbing and reporting misconduct. This Bulletin functions because journalists and observers have access to polling stations and election officials. Simply the

sense of "we are watching" has in the past proved an important check.

But this election was different. Observation was blocked and the Frelimo party machine, noted above, exerted a much stronger control than in the past. Problems were most serious in Gaza, where

the civil society observation leader was assassinated by a police hit squad (see box on next page), Zambézia, Tete and Nampula.

"The CC notes with appreciation the growing interest" in observation - from only 3,530 national observers in 2014 to an incredible 42,382 observers registered for 15 October 2019. Nearly half, 19,497, were in Zambézia province. But in this election, observation was manipulated. Many of the observers were openly Frelimo aligned and came

Police murder CSO observation head

A police hit squad assassinated Anastacio Matavel, the coordinator of civil society observation in Gaza, on 7 October 2019, just a week before the elections. The murder of a CSO leader during elections is unprecedented in Mozambique, and was a brutal statement of opposition to election observation in Gaza province.

Matavel was speaking at an observer training session in Xai-Xai. The hit squad was waiting and as he drove away its car pulled up beside Matavel's car and he was shot 10 times, killing him.

Similar assassinations have taken place, and during this election campaign at least 9 opposition leaders and politicians were killed by unidentified assailants.

But Matavel's killers were identified because in their haste to escape they crashed into three other vehicles, killing two of the assailants. and injuring one other - who were soon publicly identified as members of the police Special Operations Group (GOE) and Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR – the riot police). The commander of the Gaza branch of the GOE, Tudelo Guirrego and commander of the Gaza UIR, Alfredo Macuacua, have now been charged with murder.

But the three actual assassins were promoted by the police on 27 December, while two were in jail and the other free and missing. The two in jail had already told a judge that they had been promised promotions, rather than cash, for killing Matavele

Without the crash, it is highly unlikely the assassins would have been caught. After the crash, it was discovered that the inept team had on 23 September killed a traffic police officer, Carlos Ubisse, confusing him with Matavel.

Matavel was Executive Director of the Gaza Provincial Forum of NGOs (FONGA), and Gaza representative of the election observation coalition "Sala da Paz" (Peace Room).

from newly formed "civil society organizations" (CSOs).

Observers must have credentials in order to enter polling stations and these are issued, officially, by the CNE and provincial elections commissions (CPEs), but in practice by STAE at both levels.

The electoral law says that the election commission must emit a credential or formally reject the observer application within five days. (Lei 8/2013 de 27 de Fevereiro alterada e republicada pela lei 12/2014, art 223) But the "party machine" system became apparent, as applications of the Frelimo aligned groups were expedited quickly, while those from traditional civil society - seen as not sympathetic to Frelimo - were left to gather dust in piles on STAE desks. In some cases, months passed without a response.

Another party machine aspect occurred on polling day, when it turned out that many of the Frelimo-aligned observers had posts in the local party, and some tried to take command of the polling station. They issued instructions to the polling station president, and aligned with the two Frelimo party poll watchers (delegates, delegados) could become quite intimidating, pressing other CSO observers and even international observers to leave and opposition party delegates not to make complaints. "The EU EOM [Election Observation Mission] received credible information and observed cases of intimidation of party delegates," it noted in its 8 November report.

In past elections one of the most important checks on the election has been the civil society parallel count (PVT, parallel vote tabulation), which is a collection of the results from a randomly selected sample of polling stations and which has accurately predicted the electoral outcome in the past. The plan for the 2019 general elections was to have the largest PVT so far. The PVT was carried out by EISA (Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa) with experienced Mozambican technicians and using observers from five CSOs. The plan was to have observers collecting information in a randomly selected sample of 5000 of the 20,162 polling stations in Mozambique (the 407 polling stations in the diaspora were not covered).

However STAE, totally illegally, simply declined to issue credentials without formally refusing. Under increasing public and diplomatic pressure more than 1000 credentials were issued to EISA-linked observers in the last days before the elections, but 2916 credentials were never issued. Three provinces were serious enough to disrupt the PVT - Zambézia issued an amazing 19,947 credentials but only issued 24% of those requested by EISA-linked CSOs. Gaza only issued 27%, Tete

39%, and Nampula 58%. In the end, EISA was only able to cover half its sample.

EISA was not alone in having problems. Other CSOs were also refused credentials, particularly in Zambézia and Gaza, where many polling stations had no independent observers. This Bulletin faced the same problem in Zambézia, where no credentials were ever issued to our correspondents, but our publisher CIP was able to obtain credentials from STAE at national level.

Parties also had a problem with STAE illegally refusing to give credential to party delegates (party poll watchers, scrutineers). By law, the district election commission (CDE) must issue credentials to two party delegates for each polling station.

In addition, Renamo secretary-general André Magibire reported at a 19 October press conference "the blocking and expulsion of Renamo party delegates and party nominated polling station staff by polling station heads with the help of the police, and the arrest of delegates and voters when they tried to protest against ballot box stuffing." This was confirmed by domestic and international observers.

The most serious case involved a new small party, New Democracy (Novo Democracia, ND) in Gaza, where 17 party delegates and the local party agent (mandatário) were arrested on polling day, 15 October, and detained for six weeks. Over 200 ND observers were expelled from polling stations by police and the STAE director on voting day for allegedly having false credentials.

EISA observation credentials

Province	Requests submitted	Credentials issued	
Niassa	259	259	100%
Cabo Delgado	477	477	100%
Nampula	1517	873	58%
Zambézia	1433	345	24%
Tete	1149	445	39%
Manica	355	355	100%
Sofala	404	252	62%
Inhambane	248	248	100%
Gaza	451	123	27%
Maputo-Pro	386	386	100%
Maputo-Cid	276	276	100%
TOTAL	6955	4039	58%

ND applied for 282 credentials which the CDE refused to issue. ND talked to national electoral authorities who put pressure on Chokwe CDE who finally issued credentials on 14 October.

Chokwe STAE admitted that it refused to issue most credentials (which was illegal) and that it only issued a few credentials. It claimed ND then illegally photocopied the real credentials and STAE ordered the delegates arrested, saying one illegality did not cancel out the other.

A strange kind of transparency

When the Constitutional Council (CC), the highest court in the land, can publicly ratify the election and then a week later, change the results to give more votes to the ruling party, and then a week after that, change the results again, and do this entirely in secret, it means that Mozambique has a very unusual conception of "transparency".

The ruling (acórdão) was full of praise for the "transparency" of the election, but the CC twice replaced one version of Acórdão 25 on the website with another, with different vote totals - not only with no announcement, but with no indication in the document that it had been amended.

Similarly, elections commissions and STAEs at all levels believe they have the right to make changes to the results and there is no requirement to keep records of the changes or to make those records public. And substantial and significant changes are made.

Polling station results sheets (editais) are often written after midnight by a very tired polling station staff, and there are inevitably errors - numbers written incorrectly or columns which do not add up correctly. Sometimes the error is obvious and can be corrected, but in other cases that polling station must be excluded. In either case, STAE (not the

elections commission) makes the decision in secret, and apparently keeps no record of the change or exclusion. Similarly in past elections polling stations with a turnout of over 100% have been excluded, but this has been done in secret and never been mentioned in any report.

CNE's directive on city, province and national counting makes clear that all of the basic operations are done by STAE. The directive accepts that there will be corrections of "material or unintelligible errors" but there is no guidance on how and when to correct or change the results, and absolutely no mention of reporting when this is done. In other words, the directive allows STAE and the elections commissions to change the results at will and completely in secret. ("Directiva Sobres a Centralização e Apuramento Distrital ou de Cidade e Provincial ..." Deliberação no 107/CNE/2019 de 2 de Outubro)

The directive also makes clear the secrecy. The only session open to political party agents ("mandatários") and therefore observers and the press is a special session in which STAE formally hands over to the election commission "the summary table of the centralization of results". Presentation is usually a power point of the tables. Political parties, observers and the media are not provided with the most basic information of how these total were arrived at.

The CC in Acórdão 25 says transparency is guaranteed by the presence of party nominees in the elections commissions and STAEs. But tabulation is done quickly and with no requirement to keep a record of the changes in votes, making it extremely difficult for a small number of party people to keep a watch over the counts.

Electoral laws set out clearly how the count should be done at the polling station, requiring all vote counting to be done immediately after the polls closed and the counting and documentation writing to be completed while the whole polling station team, observers, party delegates and press are still present. Observers noted various violations. Some polling station teams totally improperly left the polling station for dinner, often for several hours, with ballot boxes unguarded. Procedures were not followed in one-third of polling stations observed, the EU said in an 8 November report. Work was not completed during the session and international observers circulated photos of staff completing results sheets (editais) and minutes sitting under trees or riding in the back of lorries.

At district level STAE corrects the editais and adds them together to give a district result. There are few clearly defined procedures and different districts do it differently, and the EU found half of districts observed doing the tabulation incorrectly.

The CNE does not report on its meetings; minutes and copies of decisions are not made available to press and parties. Formal decisions (deliberações and resoluções) are eventually published in the official Boletim da República, with some delay. The CNE and STAE do not make effective use of their website <http://www.stae.org.mz/>, which was down at the time of writing this report. STAE does its own parallel count based on polling station results sheets (editais) and in the past this was sometimes made public, but in municipal

There is no 'audit trail'

Businesses usually have their accounts audited independently to check for errors or fraud. To facilitate this, accounts must include a record of entries added, deleted and changed. This is known as an "audit trail" because it allows the independent auditor to reconstruct the accounting process and identify suspicious actions.

Elections and other complex systems normally have audit trails for the same reason, to check where mistakes or fraudulent actions occurred. Mozambique is highly unusual in that its electoral system has never included an audit trail.

Just as the CC could change its ruling without saying so and without identifying the change, throughout the electoral process results can be changed with no record of the change. The check, as stressed by the CC, is representatives of other parties in elections commissions and STAE looking over the shoulder of the person making the change. Even at polling stations, observers noted staff writing results sheets and minutes on their own, sitting under trees or in the transport to the district headquarters. And district, provincial and national tabulations are totally unrecorded. There is no audit trail.

Even the restricted PVT showed significant problems (detailed in the next section) such as ballot box stuffing, and there is no way of knowing whether stuffed ballot boxes were excluded or included. With no audit trail and a system which depends for security only on people spying on each other, then the results cannot be seen as trustworthy.

elections in 2018 it showed that results in several municipalities had been changed to take victory away from the opposition. So in 2019 the STAE parallel count was not public.

Despite repeated requests, information on party funding was never made available.

The CNE set up a press centre for the 2019 general elections but it was hardly used because so little information was available.

CNE above the law

The National Elections Commission (CNE) violated the law with total impunity. Four examples included party funding, the order of parties on the ballot paper, tabulation, and publication of results.

The CNE distributed \$3 mn to political parties, but did not follow the electoral law. Money must be distributed 21 days before the start of the campaign, 30 August last year. But money was

only distributed after the campaign began. And the CNE refused repeated requests to detail how money was allocated. In fact the allocation violated the law.

The law (art 38 of law 2/2019) says that "distribution of state funds must take into account the proportion of candidates presented with respect to the seats to be filled". The implication is that each candidate for parliament should received the same amount of state funds, but the CNE did not do this. At the most extreme, each candidate standing for the single AR seat in Africa received 345,000 MT (\$5587), while each candidate for one of the 45 seats in Nampula received only 5,000 MT (\$81).

There are three elections - President, national parliament (AR), and provincial assemblies (APs) - and there is 60 million meticaís (\$972,000) in government money for parties for each election. The obvious decision would be to simply divide 60 mn MT between the 4 presidential candidates, 60 mn MT between the 5232 parliamentary candidates, and 60 mn MT between the 2863 AP candidates.

But the CNE instead decided that for AR and AP elections, money should first be divided between equally between constituencies - for AR there are 13 constituencies (11 provinces plus Africa and Europe) and for AP just 10 constituencies (the provinces except Maputo city which already has an elected municipal assembly). But Nampula has 45 AR seats and Zambézia 41, while Africa and Europe have 1 each, which means a huge variation in the amount of money for each candidate - not proportional as the law specifies. The gainers are the three big parties, Frelimo, Renamo, and MDM, which have members of the CNE, while the small parties lost substantial money.

The CC does the draw for the order of the can-

didates on the presidential ballot paper, and the CNE does the draw for AR and AP ballot papers. The law (art 188, law 2/2019) says that the CNE will "first sort those parties with candidates in all constituencies and then the rest." But when the actual draw took place it followed a different procedure, published only later as Deliberação 101/CNE/2019. It said there would be one draw for both AR and AP elections, then said the first four parties on the list would be those with presidential candidates, in the order drawn by the CC, putting Frelimo first on all three ballot papers. Next they drew all remaining parties, whether or not they were standing in all constituencies. This put AMUSI in 4th position even though it was not standing in all constituencies, and 3 parties standing in all constituencies were below some who were not, which clearly violates art 188.

The CNE apparently does not follow the law in doing the national tabulation. The law sets a pyramid: votes are counted at the polling station, those results are collected at district level, and those results are summed at provincial level. The CNE is simply supposed to add together the provincial totals. Instead, it appears that the CNE does its own tabulation from copies of polling stations results sheets (editais), largely ignoring the district and provincial tabulations. Finally, the law (art 121, 123 lei 2/2019) requires that the CNE publish the results for each constituency which for AP means by district. The CNE never published district details for the AP and refused to provide them to this Bulletin, in clear violation of the law. The CC in its final ruling (Acórdão 25) did publish the district results, albeit with errors.

Many lost and stolen votes

Can any numbers be trusted?

The CNE found 152,000 more votes for parliament (AR) than the district elections commissions (CDEs) reported. How, where? If anyone knows, they are not telling. Are they real, mistakes, or frauds? There is no way to know. Comparing registration figures shows that the CDEs excluded some polling stations which the CNE included, but there is no way of knowing why. Did CDEs exclude some polling stations which had unbelievably high turnout, but the CNE include them?

The CNE does not publish results by district; results sheets (editais) are posted by district and provincial elections commissions, but the CNE does not make them available on the web. Parties and journalists must go to the elections commission offices and copy down the numbers - which our team did. CNE remains above the law. It

must publish district results at least from provincial assemblies (APs), but it did not.

We have posted district elections commissions results for president (<http://bit.ly/Dis-Pres>) and parliament (AR, <http://bit.ly/Dis-AR>) The Constitutional Council did publish district results for APs. We compared them to the CDE official results from

our correspondents; almost every district was different.

The electoral law (2/91) sets up an elaborate cascade process for tabulation - district STAEs add up the polling station results sheets (editais), provinces add the districts, and the CNE adds up the provincial lists. But it apparently never happens that way. A copy of every polling station edital is also sent to national STAE, which apparently does its own count which it gives to the CNE - thus the differences from the district counts.

The secrecy of the second count is compounded by basic arithmetic errors made (in secret) by the CNE and CC - the two senior bodies on elections. The CNE repeatedly left out the diaspora vote from some, but not all, of its totals. It approved these wrong results and gave them to the CC which rubber stamped them. Following Bulletin articles, in secret, it twice corrected the error - the first time for President and the second time, partially, for AR. But the second secretly corrected version still has obvious errors. The first table on page 32 of the CC ruling (acórdão 25) has been corrected but not the second; the table "Eleições para deputados da Assembleia da República" is correct but the table below "Distribuição de mandatos" still excludes votes from the diaspora.

In two different tables later in the ruling annex, on page 104 "Eleição dos Deputados da AR" and page 487 "Eleição dos Membros das Assembleias Provinciais" the bottom row "votos na urna" (votes in ballot box), is different from "Número Total de Votantes" (Total Number of Voters) higher up in the table, yet by definition they must be the same. Votos na Urna are both incorrect because the totals exclude nulos (invalid ballots), which were obviously in the ballot box. This, in turn, leads to another error. On page 104 the percentages for blank and invalid votes are wrong because they are based on the erroneous Votos na Urna rather than Número Total de Votantes. CC and CNE may dismiss these as small errors, but if the highest court in the land and the top electoral authority cannot even add up columns of numbers, how can any of their secretly compiled numbers be trusted?

Novo Curso: Mestrado Em Fraude Eleitoral

DISCIPLINAS:

1. MATEMÁTICA ELEITORAL
2. ENCHIMENTO DE URNAS
3. ANULAMENTO DE VOTOS
4. FALSIFICAÇÃO DE EDITAIS
5. ENFRENTAR A COMUNICAÇÃO SEM VERGONHA

Professores Moçambicanos e com mais de 24 anos de experiência prática.

Sloppiness in secret has proved contagious. Observers reported widespread violations of procedures during the counting at polling stations and in the district tabulation processes, which opened the door to errors and fraud. Results sheets were filled in with no one watching, and some numbers were changed. In key areas, observers could not obtain credentials, so there was no check.

It is hardly surprising that many people do not trust a vote counting process riddled with errors and lack of transparency. A meme circulated widely on the internet during 2018 local elections advertising a master's degree in electoral fraud taught by Mozambican professors with 24 years practical experience.

Just using the limited official information and the civil society parallel count (PVT), we are able to identify 557,000 votes given to President Filipe Nyusi or taken from opposition candidate Ossufo Momade (detailed below). This is 8% of the total vote and 17% of Nyusi's margin over Momade. We also find 5 parliament (AR) seats improperly given to Frelimo instead of Renamo. And this is just the tip of the iceberg we can see. Because of the secrecy and lack of information, it is impossible to identify, quantify and pinpoint the large amounts of fraud we cannot see.

The tip of the iceberg: Half a million fraudulent votes

All of Mozambique's elections have had some fraud and sloppiness, but it was more extreme in the 2019 general elections. For example, there have always been reports of small numbers of ballot papers pre-marked for Frelimo in the hands of voters or Frelimo officials outside of polling stations - which requires the collusion of polling station staff who must illegally remove ballots from books in polling stations or at STAEs.

In 2019 these reports were much more common and there were more reports during the counts of

three to five ballot papers folded together and deposited in the ballot box, which had to be

separated during the count and thus obviously had been put into the box together.

Most fraud in the polling stations is carried out by, or with the collusion of, polling station staff. This occurs at three points in the process. Most polling stations are in classrooms and when the votes are counted one-by-one, tick-marks are put on the blackboard, grouped in 5s. But there may be a hundred or more groups of 5, and it is easy to "miscount" - indeed, the official STAE manual for polling station staff blatantly shows how to do this: <http://bit.ly/STAE-board>

Ballot papers are placed in piles on the floor. Many polling stations have no electricity, so it is easy in the dark to move ballot papers from the opposition pile to the blank or invalid pile. In previous elections invalid votes were checked by national CNE, in public, and there were often handfuls of valid votes in the invalid pile which were accepted as valid and added by the CNE to opposition vote totals. There was also ample evidence of opposition votes being invalidated by adding a fingerprint for a second candidate. Probably because this was being picked up, increasing numbers of opposition votes were put in the blank pile, which has never been checked. Rules were changed for 2019, and invalid votes are no longer checked, meaning that significant numbers of valid votes remain in the invalid piles.

The official results sheets (editais) for the three elections - president, parliament, and provincial assembly - are only written when all of the counting of all three is finished. This is often at the early hours of the morning by tired staff with party delegates and observers sleeping or having gone home. Few observers or delegates remember what was written on the blackboard or may simply allow a count of the piles of ballots to check. Thus staff are free to inflate and invent numbers.

Ballot box stuffing tends to occur in areas which already strongly support Frelimo, because polling staff already back Frelimo and will not object to adding Frelimo votes. The most gross examples are in Gaza and Tete, and are the same districts that have seen large scale ballot box stuffing in past elections. CC data shows that in Gaza five entire districts each voted 99% for Nyusi, and had unbelievably high turnouts: Massangena and Chicualacuala 96%; Chigubo 95%, Mabalane 92% and Mapai 91% turnout. And the same two Tete districts turn up in each election: Zumbu 90% turnout and 89% Frelimo, and Changara 86% turnout but 97% Frelimo. These are not single polling stations, but entire districts.

Whereas ballot box stuffing occurs in predominantly Frelimo zones, taking votes away from the opposition is more common in contested areas and particularly in the north, notably Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Zambézia, where

Votes improperly given to Nyusi or taken from the opposition in large scale fraud

	Given to Nyusi	Taken from opposition	Total
Ballot box stuffing	148,000		
Using invalid and blank votes to cancel opposition votes		110,000	
Ghost voters, inflated registration - Africa, Cabo Delgado, Gaza	259,000		
Zambézia under registration		40,000	
TOTAL	407,000	150,000	557,000

there is less ballot box stuffing. Tete is a divided province and has districts in both categories.


For the provincial assemblies (APs) with its short ballot paper, we find it bizarre and impossible that 36 of 164 entire districts had more than 8.5% blank votes. Cabo Delgado had the highest levels of blank votes, the most extreme being Namuno with 18% blank votes, Chiure district with 17% blank and Mecufi 16%. Cabo Delgado had become a highly contested province, because Renamo unexpectedly won Chiure town in 2018 municipal elections. With only 4 parties on the AP ballot paper, were 1 in 6 voters really unable to choose, or were votes taken away from Renamo?

The PVT sample data for the presidential vote showed similar extremes for invalid votes in individual polling stations in the presidential election. A polling station at Monequera primary school, Ulongué, Angonia district, in Tete had 45% invalid votes. There were polling stations with more than 25% invalid votes in Tete (especially Angonia and Maravia), Nampula (Mossuril), Niassa (Mecanhelas), Zambézia (Molumbo), and Manica. We do not believe that up to half of voters made mistakes.

We cannot identify small fraud, a few extra ballot papers or minor changes to the edital. But we can use statistical techniques to identify large scale fraud - exceptionally high turnout implies large scale ballot box stuffing, very high invalid or blank votes suggest votes taken from the opposition, and registering more people than there are voting age adults seems impossible. In a study published 10 November 2019, the bulletin estimated large-scale fraud and gave details of our methods: <http://bit.ly/MozElStuff>. We summarise this below. Some of the data we use here comes from an extrapolation of the PVT (parallel vote tabulation) which covered 2,507 of the 20,162 polling station in a randomly selected sample of 12.4%.

A key to any statistical analysis is that electoral data should have what is called a "normal distribution", which means it that most points are near the mean and are equally distributed on the two sides of the mean. Scatter diagrams are useful because they give a visual representation of data. On our charts, the vertical axis is the percentage of the vote for Nyusi and the horizontal axis is the turnout. The points are PVT polling stations, so we can "see" the polling stations. Thus our polling stations should be concentrated in the centre of the scatter diagram. We show here scatter diagrams of the two provinces, Maputo City and Tete.

Maputo shows a largely normal distribution - turnout was 57% and Nuysi had 69% of the vote - both in the centre of the blob of polling stations.



Now look at Tete. Polling stations are more scattered but the turnout of 60% and the vote for Nyusi of 77% are in the middle of the polling station points. However, note the large number of polling stations in the upper right corner, with a disproportionate number over 80% for Nyusi and far too many also with over 75% turnout. This is not a statistically "normal" distribution. Looking at the diagram, we can "see" the polling stations on the upper right with improper and excessive turnout.

Using statistical techniques we conclude that the three types of fraud - ballot box stuffing, spoiling ballot papers to take votes from the opposition, and over and under registration - inflated Nyusi's margin of victory by at least 557,000 fraudulent votes.

Stuffing the ballot box

Ballot box "stuffing" traditionally involves putting extra ballot papers in the ballot box. But in Mozambique it more often means changing the results sheet ("edita"), in many cases adding hundreds of votes.

Details of how we make our estimates are in the 10 November study on <http://bit.ly/MozEIStuff>. The median turnout is around 50% and most polling stations have a turnout between 25% and 75%, with few below 25%. But 7.5% of polling stations (more than 1500) have turnout over 75% and high votes for Nyusi. We consider these to be stuffed ballot boxes, and estimate that they contain 90,000 extra votes for Nyusi.

We also note that 58,000 more people voted from president than voted for parliament (AR) yet no one reports voters putting a ballot paper into the presidential ballot box but not into the parliamentary box. There were, however, many anecdotal reports of individuals putting a few extra ballot papers into the box, often folded together. We take the 58,000 as an estimate of those extra ballot papers. Thus we estimate at least 148,000 stuffed ballot papers for Nyusi.

Inflated registration & ghost voters

Mozambique has 13 parliamentary constituencies. We show that registration was manipulated in 4 of them. In Africa, Gaza and Cabo Delgado the registration was increased to raise the number of votes for presidential candidate Filipe Nyusi, while in Zambézia it was restricted to curb the opposition vote.

AFRICA: Mozambicans in the diaspora can vote for president and elect one seat in parliament each for Africa and Europe. African registration has risen steadily from 44,000 in 2004 to 55,000 in 2009 and 89,000 in 2014. STAE predicted a similar increase for 2019, to 115,000. But the official registration was nearly 213,000. We accept the STAE estimate as plausible but think the huge increase is of fake or "ghost" voters. If we assume the ghosts voted in the same proportion as other voters, they would have given 62,000 votes from Nyusi. We consider these ghost votes as a form of ballot box stuffing for Nyusi.

GAZA: The most discussed scandal of this election has been the over registration in Gaza, where 1,166,001 people were registered, which is

329,430 more people than the voting age population of Gaza, 836,581, according to the 2017 national population census. Both the head of the National Statistics Institute and the head of the census were dismissed for refusing to bend the census numbers to match the registration.

We note that in nine of the 11 provinces, STAE set a registration target which was 90% of voting age adults, as shown by the census. The two exceptions are Gaza, with a target of 137% of voting age adults, and Zambézia discussed below. Nationally, registration was 82.5% of voting age adults.

If we say that the target should be 90% of voting age adults and are generous and say that 95% of them would be registered, then Gaza should only have 715,277 voters. Thus the excess is 450,724 voters - that is 3.4% of the entire national register book. We believe in the accuracy of the 2017 census, which has won praise, so these people cannot exist. Thus we consider them "ghost voters".

We note that 85% of the ghosts are in the five largest districts, and we note that in four of our five districts (not Chokwe) turnout dropped dramatically compared to previous elections. We attribute this to ghosts not voting, particularly where there were observers. PVT observers noted some polling stations where no one voted except the staff. We believe that of 450,724 ghosts, only 162,000 actually voted, and that they voted for Nyusi.

CABO DELGADO: Three provinces registered more than 95% of their target, while the overall registration was only 91% of the target and 82% of voting age adults. The three top provinces were Gaza and Zambézia at 102% of target and Cabo Delgado at 101%. We do not believe that Cabo Delgado actually registered 91% of voting age adults, beaten only by Gaza at 139%. The third highest percentage registration is Maputo city at 87% of voting age adults. Taking a number between Maputo city and the average of 82%, we say 85% registration could be seen as reasonable for Cabo Delgado, which thus has 6% over registration, about 71,000 ghost voters. We further assume that ghost voters had the same turnout as real voters, 49%, and that they all voted for Nyusi. That gives an extra 35,000 votes for Nyusi.

TOTAL GHOSTS: Adding together the ghost voters in the diaspora (Africa), Gaza and Cabo Delgado gives a massive 259,000 ghost votes for Nyusi.

ZAMBÉZIA: In Zambézia, instead of creating ghost voters, STAE excluded real voters. Zambézia is traditionally an opposition province, and Frelimo was anxious to prevent the election of a charismatic Renamo candidate for governor. In 9 provinces, STAE set a registration target very close to 90% of voting age adults, but uniquely in

Zambézia it was set at 77%. This is important because the number of registration brigades assigned was proportional to the target, so Zambézia had fewer registration teams than necessary. There were continuous complaints during the April-May 2019 registration period of registration brigades not being available and, when they were available, the solar panels that charged the laptop computers often did not work. This occurred particularly in strong opposition areas. Despite the problems, there was a strong desire to register, and registration was 102% of the reduced target. Following the reasoning of Cabo Delgado, if we assume that 85% of voters had been able to register in Zambézia, there would have been 186,000 more voters registered. Turnout in Zambézia was 43%, so we assume 80,000 of them would have voted. Because the registration suppression appears to have targeted the strongest opposition areas, we assume 60,000 would have voted for Momade and 20,000 for Nyusi. Therefore we say the under-registration took 40,000 votes from Momade.

AR SEATS: These registration frauds by STAE would also have had an impact on the national parliament (AR, Assembleia da República). Gaza was improperly given 8 extra seats, while Zambézia lost 4 and Nampula, Tete, Manica and Maputo city lost 1 seat each. If we also take away the inflated votes, we estimate that Renamo would have won 5 of the 8 seats (3 in Zambézia, 1 in Nampula, and 1 in Tete).

The election law allows the CNE or CC to annul part or all of an election "only if there are illegalities that may substantially influence the general result of the elections". Surely 5 or 8 parliamentary seats improperly and illegally allocated is a "substantial" change to the result.

Votes taken from opposition

Two kinds of votes are excluded during the counting, blank votes (brancos) in which no candidate is indicated, and invalid votes (nullos) in which it is not clear which candidate has been chosen or where a word has been written on the ballot paper. In the past invalid votes were reconsidered by the CNE. In the 2014 presidential election, polling stations considered 4.4% of ballot papers invalid, but the CNE accepted more than one fourth of those, leaving 3.2% invalid. The reconsideration process was open and it was obvious that two things had occurred in the polling stations. As opposition parties complained repeatedly, opposition ballot papers had been made invalid by a member of the polling station staff adding a fingerprint for a second candidate; this was obvious in a significant number of occurrences where a series of a dozen or more

ballot papers would have the same extra fingerprint in exactly the same place on the ballot paper. In 2014 a new fraud was noted in which a group of valid opposition ballot papers had simply been included with invalid votes, probably moved from one pile on the floor to another in the dark during the count late at night in the polling station. There is no longer any check, but we assume no change in the 1.2% of ballot papers improperly included in the nullos. We take 1.2% of the 6.8 million votes to be votes for the opposition improperly taken, about 82,000 votes.

Blank votes are never checked. In this election the total number of blank votes was 4.2% of all votes. Again the distribution of blank votes should follow a normal distribution and we assume any blank votes over 8.5% of the vote in a polling station are improperly taken from the opposition. Using the PVT data, we estimate 28,000 blank votes above 8.5% in individual polling stations. Thus we add these to estimate 110,000 votes improperly taken from the opposition.

Conclusion: A new kind of transparency

Mozambique's democracy has always had an unusual shape. In a show of transparency, votes are counted at the polling station in the presence of parties, observers and journalists. But the electoral laws have always allowed elections commissions and STAEs at district, provincial and national level to change the results in secret - something unheard of in other electoral democracies. In past electoral cycles, observation, parallel counts, and a sense of justice in the electoral and court system balanced the openness of the polling stations with the closed world of the elections commissions.

For example, Changara district in Tete has become a standing joke - it is the healthiest district in the Mozambique because no one dies, everyone votes, and they all vote for Frelimo. But in 2009, the CNE (in secret, of course) excluded 50 Changara polling stations because the ballot box stuffing was particularly grotesque. And in 2013 the Constitutional Council carried out its own investigation after the parallel count showed an opposition victory in Gurué but the official results gave the win to Frelimo. The CC found fraud by the Gurué district and Zambézia provincial elections commissions, and forced a re-run of the 2013 municipal elections in Gurué, which the opposition won.

But neither the CNE nor the CC intervened in response to much more gross misconduct in 2018 municipal elections and 2019 general elections. Instead, transparency took on an entire new meaning - that the power of the Frelimo party machine was openly demonstrated to observers, journalists and other parties. In Gaza where 329,430 more people were registered than there are voting age adults, the respected heads of statistics and of the census were dismissed when they defended the accuracy of the census. And the head of civil society observation in Gaza was

gunned down by a police death squad. In Zambézia more than 1000 genuine civil society observers were refused credentials, but more than 10,000 Frelimo affiliated "observers" were given credentials and in polling stations openly intimidated polling station staff, party delegates, domestic observers, and in some cases, even international observers.

Although journalists and this Bulletin's correspondents were more constrained than in the past, they remained largely free to report. Indeed this was probably the best reported election - the Bulletin had over 450 correspondents and other media and civil society groups reported in more detail than in the past. We were free to report the open theft of elections in at least four municipalities in 2018, where parallel counts showed opposition victories but official counts carried out in secret gave victories to Frelimo. We were free to report a 2019 landslide in which Frelimo won every district and every province. And we were free to report in detail that this was the worst multi-party election in Mozambique.

Transparency is no longer about the elections themselves, but about demonstrating the power of the Frelimo party machine to control the electoral process.

Details of three elections

There were three elections on 15 October 2019:

- Presidential elections in Mozambique and in the diaspora.
- Elections for the national parliament (Assembleia da República, AR). The constituencies are the 10 provinces, Maputo city, Africa and Europe.
- Provincial assemblies in the 10 provinces but not Maputo City, Africa, or Europe. Constituencies are the districts, plus a constituency for the entire province. Electors vote only once but the vote is applied to both district and province lists. The head of the provincial list with the most votes is elected governor.

Validation and proclamation of results- Constitutional Council

Validação e Proclamação dos Resultados Eleitorais - Conselho Constitucional

Acórdão no 25/CC/2019 de 22 de Dezembro (2nd correction - 2ª correção)

Presidente da República

Província	Inscritos	Votantes	Afluência	Votos Válidos - Valid Votes				
Province	Registered	Voters	Turnout	Nyusi	Simango	Momade	Albino	Total
Niassa	677 764	300 212	44.29%	188 030	8 782	76 439	1 578	274 829
Cabo Delgado	1 185 024	582 380	49.14%	385 996	19 111	106 262	3 651	515 020
Nampula	2 361 973	1 013 529	42.91%	546 485	34 268	314 446	17 205	912 404
Zambézia	2 140 125	917 219	42.86%	541 399	29 403	236 344	5 903	813 049
Tete	1 119 378	671 152	59.96%	476 113	13 491	122 810	2 851	615 265
Manica	893 426	543 112	60.79%	381 822	12 554	113 204	2 555	510 135
Sofala	1 029 354	593 725	57.68%	377 902	65 066	111 925	2 612	557 505
Inhambane	657 142	352 659	53.67%	266 276	14 404	43 763	2 818	327 261
Gaza	1 166 011	741 513	63.59%	679 929	14 555	20 535	2 683	717 702
Maputo Prov	1 015 798	552 913	54.43%	387 489	29 509	113 928	1 806	532 732
Maputo Cidade	701 184	410 594	58.56%	276 108	29 472	91 628	1 603	398 811
África	212 663	143 479	67.47%	130 598	2 830	5 285	778	139 491
Europe	2 479	1 439	58.05%	1 025	154	217	5	1 401
Total	13 162 321	6 823 926	51.84%	4 639 045	273 397	1 356 644	46 043	6 315 129

Província	Votos Válidos - Valid Votes				Votos em Branco		Votos Nulos	
Province	Nyusi	Simango	Momade	Albino	Blank votes		Invalid votes	
Niassa	68.42%	3.20%	27.81%	0.57%	14 552	4.85%	10 831	3.61%
Cabo Delgado	74.95%	3.71%	20.63%	0.71%	46 978	8.07%	20 382	3.50%
Nampula	59.90%	3.76%	34.46%	1.89%	62 616	6.18%	38 509	3.80%
Zambézia	66.59%	3.62%	29.07%	0.73%	55 585	6.06%	48 585	5.30%
Tete	77.38%	2.19%	19.96%	0.46%	26 765	3.99%	29 122	4.34%
Manica	74.85%	2.46%	22.19%	0.50%	19 332	3.56%	13 645	2.51%
Sofala	67.78%	11.67%	20.08%	0.47%	19 925	3.36%	16 295	2.74%
Inhambane	81.37%	4.40%	13.37%	0.86%	13 703	3.89%	11 695	3.32%
Gaza	94.74%	2.03%	2.86%	0.37%	11 674	1.57%	12 137	1.64%
Maputo Prov	72.74%	5.54%	21.39%	0.34%	8 203	1.48%	11 978	2.17%
Maputo City	69.23%	7.39%	22.98%	0.40%	4 096	1.00%	7 687	1.87%
África	93.62%	2.03%	3.79%	0.56%	998	0.70%	2 990	2.08%
Europe	73.16%	10.99%	15.49%	0.36%	19	1.32%	19	1.32%
Total	73.46%	4.33%	21.48%	0.73%	284 446	4.17%	224 351	3.29%

Deputados da Assembleia da República, Member of Parliament

Província	Inscritos	Votantes	Afluência	Votos Válidos - Valid Votes				
Province	Registered	Voters	Turnout	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Others/ Outros	Total
Niassa	677 764	282 112	41.82%	170 176	7 404	70 730	4 779	253 089
Cabo Delgado	1 185 024	582 521	49.16%	353 205	14 817	96 673	12 541	477 236
Nampula	2 361 973	1 001 505	42.40%	495 642	28 612	299 150	30 726	854 130
Zambézia	2 140 125	906 078	42.34%	505 906	26 217	228 615	11 739	772 477
Tete	1 119 378	666 808	59.57%	457 526	12 208	121 808	7 794	599 336
Manica	893 426	542 520	60.72%	365 358	12 568	110 945	7 456	496 327
Sofala	1 029 354	593 058	57.61%	361 408	67 115	110 386	6 449	545 483
Inhambane	657 142	353 641	53.85%	246 212	14 114	44 016	13 886	318 228
Gaza	1 166 011	730 360	62.64%	654 244	11 973	18 180	15 126	699 523
Maputo Prov	1 015 798	553 632	54.50%	343 267	25 672	136 144	13 254	518 331
Maputo Ciity	701 184	409 247	58.37%	242 127	30 647	109 362	10 514	392 627
África	212 663	143 496	67.48%	127 286	2 782	5 386	1 853	137 307
Europe	2 479	1 438	58.01%	940	161	264	31	1 396
Total	13 162 321	6 766 416	51.41%	4 323 298	254 290	1 351 659	136 274	6 065 521

Província	Votos Válidos - Valid Votes				Votos em Branco		Votos Nulos	
Province	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Others/ Outros	Blank votes		Invalid votes	
Niassa	67.24%	2.93%	27.95%	1.89%	16 074	5.70%	12 949	4.59%
Cabo Delgado	74.01%	3.10%	20.26%	2.63%	77 069	13.23%	28 216	4.84%
Nampula	58.03%	3.35%	35.02%	3.60%	103 179	10.30%	44 196	4.41%
Zambézia	65.49%	3.39%	29.60%	1.52%	65 921	7.28%	67 680	7.47%
Tete	76.34%	2.04%	20.32%	1.30%	33 862	5.08%	33 610	5.04%
Manica	73.61%	2.53%	22.35%	1.50%	32 134	5.92%	14 057	2.59%
Sofala	66.25%	12.30%	20.24%	1.18%	25 637	4.32%	21 938	3.70%
Inhambane	77.37%	4.44%	13.83%	4.36%	22 384	6.33%	13 029	3.68%
Gaza	93.53%	1.71%	2.60%	2.16%	16 509	2.26%	14 328	1.96%
Maputo Prov	66.22%	4.65%	26.27%	2.56%	19 854	3.59%	15 441	2.79%
Maputo Ciity	61.66%	7.81%	27.85%	2.68%	8 357	2.04%	8 240	2.01%
África	92.70%	2.03%	3.92%	1.35%	1 228	0.86%	4 961	3.46%
Europe	67.34%	11.53%	18.91%	2.22%	21	1.46%	21	1.46%
Total	71.28%	4.19%	22.28%	2.25%	422 229	6.24%	280 037	4.14%

Votos de AR para pequenos partidos - Small party AR votes

Partido	votos total	%	MJRD	4054	0.07%	PANAOC	5173	0.09%
Amusi	27,277	0.45%	PEMO	3313	0.05%	PT	2868	0.05%
PUR	5399	0.09%	PARENA	6469	0.11%	PLD	4143	0.07%
PJDM	2036	0.03%	PVM	5361	0.09%	PANAMO/CRD	6768	0.11%
MPD	5883	0.10%	PASOMO	2006	0.03%	UM	8347	0.14%
ND	25046	0.41%	UE	3769	0.06%			
UD	2720	0.04%	PARESO	3365	0.06%			
PPPM	3431	0.06%	UDM	2579	0.04%			
MONARUMO	3820	0.06%	PEC-MT	1783	0.03%			
						TOTAL	136274	2.25%

Mandatos para Deputados à Assembleia da República e de Membros das Assembleias Provinciais

Seats in national parliament (AR) and provincial assemblies

Assembleia da República

Província	AR Assentos - Seats			
	Fr	M	R	Tot
Niassa	9		4	13
C. Delgado	18		5	23
Nampula	28	1	16	45
Zambézia	28	1	12	41
Tete	17		4	21
Manica	13		4	17
Sofala	14	2	4	20
Inhambane	11		2	13
Gaza	22			22
Maputo Prov	14	1	5	20
Maputo City	8	1	4	13
África	1			1
Europe	1			1
Total	184	6	60	250

F = Frelimo, M = MDM,
R = Renamo, Tot = Total

Assembleias Provinciais

	Fr	M	Re	Tot
Niassa				
Lichinga	7		3	10
Cuamba	6		3	9
Chimbunila	2			2
Lago	3		2	5
Majune	1			1
Mandimba	3		1	4
Marrupa	2		1	3
Maua	2			2
Mavago	1			1
Mecanhelas	3		2	5
Mecula	1			1
Metarica	2			2
Muembe	1			1
Njauma	2			2
Nipepe	1			1
Sanga	2			2
PROVINCE	7		2	9
TOTAL	46		14	60

	Fr	M	Re	Tot
C. Delgado				
Pemba	5		2	7
Ancuabe	3		1	4
Balama	4		1	5
Chiure	6		3	9
Ibo	1			1
Macomia	3			3
Mecufi	2			2
Meluco	1			1
Metunge	2			2
Moc. d Praia	4		1	5
Monepuez	6		3	9
Mueda	6			6
Muidumbe	3			3
Namuno	5		2	7
Nangade	3			3
Palma	1		1	2
Quissanga	1			1
PROVINCE	10		2	12
TOTAL	66		16	82
Nampula				
Nampula Cid.	9		5	14
Angoche	4		2	6
Eráti-Namapa	4		2	6
Ilha da Moç.	1			1
Lalaua	2			2
Larde	1			1
Liúpo	1			1
Malema	3		1	4
Meconta	2		1	3
Mecuburi	2		1	3
Memba	2		1	3
Mogincual	1			1
Mogovolas	3		1	4
Moma	2		2	4
Monapo	4		2	6
Mossuril	1		1	2
Muecate	1			1
Murupula	2		1	3
Nacala-Porto	3		2	5
Nacala-a-Velha	1		1	2
Nacarua	1		1	2
Rapale	1		1	2
Ribáue	3		1	4
PROVINCE	9		5	14
TOTAL	63		31	94

	Fr	M	Re	Tot
Zambézia				
Quelimane	4		3	7
Alto Molócue	4		2	6
Gurué	5		2	7
Mag. da Costa	3		1	4
Milange	5		3	8
Mocuba	5		3	8
Chinde	1			1
Derre	1			1
Gilé*	3		1	4
Ile	4			4
Inhassunge	1			1
Luabo	1			1
Lugela	3			3
Mocubela	1			1
Mopeia	2			2
Molumbo	2			2
Morrumbala	4		1	5
Mulevala	1			1
Namacurra	2		1	3
Namarroi	2			2
Nicoadala	2		1	3
Pebane	3		1	4
PROVINCE	10		4	14
TOTAL	69		23	92
Tete				
Tete Cidade	7		3	10
Angónia	7		6	13
Cahora Bas.	4			4
Changara	3			3
Chifunde	3			3
Chiúta	3			3
Macanga	3			3
Magoé	3			3
Marávia	2		1	3
Moatize	6		4	10
Mutarara	5			5
Tsangano	3		1	4
Zumbu	2			2
Marara	2			2
Doa	2			2
PROVINCE	10		2	12
TOTAL	65		17	82

	Fr	M	Re	Tot
Manica				
Chimoio	10		4	14
Báruè	7		1	8
Gondola	5		2	7
Manica Dist.	6		2	8
Guro	3			3
Macate	3			3
Machaze	3		1	4
Macossa	2			2
Mossurize	4		2	6
Sussendnga	5		1	6
Tambara	2			2
Vanduzi	4		1	5
PROVINCE	9		3	12
TOTAL	63		17	80
Sofala				
Beira	11	7	4	22
Buzi	3		2	5
Caia	3			3
Chemba	2			2
Cheringoma	1		1	2
Chibabava	3			3
Dondo	6		1	7
Gorongosa	5		1	6
Marchanga	1			1
Maríngue	3			3
Marromeu	5			5
Muanza	1			1
Nhamatanda	7		2	9
PROVINCE	9	1	2	12
TOTAL	60	8	13	81

	Fr	M	Re	Tot
Inhambane				
Inhamb. C.	4			4
Funhalouro	2			2
Govuro	1			1
Homoíne	4			4
Inharrime	3			3
Inhassoro	2			2
Jangamo	3			3
Mabote	2			2
Massinga	6		2	8
Maxixe	5		1	6
Morrumbene	3		1	4
Panda	1			1
Vilankulo	5		1	6
Zavala	5			5
PROVINCE	8		1	9
TOTAL	54		6	60

Gaza				
Xai-Xai	8		1	9
Bilene	8			8
Chibuto	11			11
Chicualacuala	1			1
Chigubo	1			1
Chokwe	14			14
Chongoene	5			5
Guijá	3			3
Limpopo	6			6
Mabalane	1			1
Mandlakazi	8			8
Mapai	1			1
Massangena	1			1
Massingir	1			1
PROVINCE	12			12
TOTAL	81		1	82

	Fr	M	Re	Tot
Maputo Pr.				
Matola	25	2	12	39
Boane	6		2	8
Magude	2			2
Manhiça	7			7
Marracuene	6		1	7
Matutuíne	1			1
Moamba	3			3
Namaacha	2			2
PROVINCE	9		3	12
TOTAL	61	2	18	81
Nacional	569	10	137	716

Votos por distrito para assembleias provinciais

Votes per district for provincial assemblies

Distrito	Inscritos	Votantes	Afluência	Votos Válidos - Valid Votes										Votos em Branco		Votos Nulos	
District	Registered	Voters	Turnout	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Outros-others	Total	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Outros-others		Blank votes		Invalid votes	
Niassa																	
Lichinga	131 702	57 504	43.7%	36 994	1 486	15 324		53 804	68.8%	2.8%	28.5%			2 930	5.1%	770	1.3%
Cuamba	124 113	42 543	34.3%	22 634	1 407	14 967		39 008	58.0%	3.6%	38.4%			2 119	5.0%	1 416	3.3%
Chimbanila	26 275	13 568	51.6%	9 491	263	2 321		12 075	78.6%	2.2%	19.2%			839	6.2%	654	4.8%
Lago	59 881	28 555	47.7%	17 055	671	8 958		26 684	63.9%	2.5%	5.9%			1 176	4.1%	695	2.4%
Majune	17 037	8 777	51.5%	5 830	268	1 562		7 660	76.1%	3.5%	20.4%			896	10.2%	221	2.5%
Mandimba	51 401	21 827	42.5%	12 835	679	6 033		19 547	65.7%	3.5%	30.9%			1 482	6.8%	798	3.7%
Marrupa	36 183	14 071	38.9%	8 825	731	3 018		12 574	70.2%	5.8%	24.0%			938	6.7%	559	4.0%
Maua	29 678	11 567	39.0%	7 347	554	2 357		10 258	71.6%	5.4%	23.0%			987	8.5%	322	2.8%
Mavago	16 448	9 068	55.1%	7 455	128	765		8 348	89.3%	1.5%	9.2%			560	6.2%	160	1.8%
Mecanhelas	70 184	30 946	44.1%	14 839	1 561	11 254		27 654	53.7%	5.6%	40.7%			1 714	5.5%	1 578	5.1%
Mecula	9 815	6 592	67.2%	4 082	301	1 362		5 745	71.1%	5.2%	23.7%			738	11.2%	109	1.7%
Metarica	20 892	11 074	53.0%	6 859	379	2 561		9 799	70.0%	3.9%	26.1%			794	7.2%	481	4.3%
Muembe	17 433	9 968	57.2%	7 917	172	1 156		9 245	85.6%	1.9%	12.5%			409	4.1%	314	3.2%
Njauma	24 182	13 255	54.8%	7 662	372	3 771		11 805	64.9%	3.2%	31.9%			726	5.5%	724	5.5%
Nipepe	17 438	8 071	46.3%	5 295	213	1 564		7 072	74.9%	3.0%	22.1%			804	10.0%	195	2.4%
Sanga	25 102	12 571	50.1%	9 194	237	1 915		11 346	81.0%	2.1%	16.9%			976	7.8%	249	2.0%
PROVINCE	677 764	299 957	44.3%	184 314	9 422	78 888		272 624	67.6%	3.5%	28.9%			18 088	6.0%	9 245	3.1%
Cabo Delgado							Pahumo					Pahumo					
Pemba	113 872	57 950	50.9%	36 895	2 262	15 075	321	54 553	67.6%	4.1%	27.6%	0.6%		2 225	3.8%	1 172	2.0%
Ancuabe	76 638	33 663	43.9%	20 100	1 207	6 408	270	27 985	71.8%	4.3%	22.9%	1.0%		4 627	13.7%	1 051	3.1%
Balama	85 239	28 958	34.0%	16 040	1 089	5 916	311	23 356	68.7%	4.7%	25.3%	1.3%		4 549	15.7%	1 053	3.6%
Chiure	152 967	67 505	44.1%	31 022	2 166	19 899	691	53 778	57.7%	4.0%	37.0%	1.3%		11 314	16.8%	2 413	3.6%
Ibo	6 861	4 407	64.2%	2 773	123	846	23	3 765	73.7%	3.3%	22.5%	0.6%		431	9.8%	211	4.8%
Macomia	53 293	29 253	54.9%	21 094	754	3 042	128	25 018	84.3%	3.0%	12.2%	0.5%		3 334	11.4%	901	3.1%
Mecufi	27 632	15 426	55.8%	7 921	442	3 704	132	12 199	64.9%	3.6%	30.4%	1.1%		2 506	16.2%	721	4.7%
Meluco	19 336	12 908	66.8%	8 946	394	1 153	63	10 556	84.7%	3.7%	10.9%	0.6%		1 968	15.2%	384	3.0%
Metunge	39 389	21 326	54.1%	13 480	839	3 457	174	17 950	75.1%	4.7%	19.3%	1.0%		2 713	12.7%	663	3.1%
Mocimboa d Praia	78 558	41 962	53.4%	27 321	699	9 415	196	37 631	72.6%	1.9%	25.0%	0.5%		2 991	7.1%	1 340	3.2%
Monepuez	146 758	54 482	37.1%	29 930	2 076	14 520	337	46 863	63.9%	4.4%	31.0%	0.7%		5 800	10.6%	1 819	3.3%
Mueda	96 306	55 431	57.6%	47 916	1 183	976	160	50 235	95.4%	2.4%	1.9%	0.3%		3 882	7.0%	1 314	2.4%
Muidumbe	54 798	38 454	70.2%	35 103	501	355	68	36 027	97.4%	1.4%	1.0%	0.2%		1 815	4.7%	612	1.6%
Namuno	119 912	47 938	40.0%	25 561	1 828	9 337	491	37 217	68.7%	4.9%	25.1%	1.3%		8 818	18.4%	1 903	4.0%
Nangade	49 043	34 280	69.9%	25 429	854	2 517	168	28 968	87.8%	2.9%	8.7%	0.6%		4 093	11.9%	1 219	3.6%
Palma	37 934	23 216	61.2%	11 691	861	6 672	205	19 429	60.2%	4.4%	34.3%	1.1%		2 702	11.6%	1 085	4.7%
Quissanga	26 488	17 018	64.2%	10 208	459	2 989	135	13 791	74.0%	3.3%	21.7%	1.0%		2 506	14.7%	721	4.2%
PROVINCE	1 185 024	584 177	49.3%	371 430	17 737	106 281	3 873	499 321	74.4%	3.6%	21.3%	0.8%		66 274	11.3%	18 582	3.2%
Nampula							Amusi					Amusi					
Nampula Cidade	416 386	210 432	50.5%	122 533	8 500	70 159	2 578	203 770	60.1%	4.2%	34.4%	1.3%		3 121	1.5%	3 541	1.7%
Angoche	170 677	86 242	50.5%	49 402	1 722	26 570	1 118	78 812	62.7%	2.2%	33.7%	1.4%		4 345	5.0%	3 085	3.6%
Eráti-Namapa	167 840	62 804	37.4%	31 834	3 143	14 864	1 098	50 939	62.5%	6.2%	29.2%	2.2%		9 643	15.4%	2 222	3.5%
Ilha da Moçam	36 012	18 821	52.3%	9 962	309	6 899	167	17 337	57.5%	1.8%	39.8%	1.0%		793	4.2%	691	3.7%
Lalaua	50 252	22 123	44.0%	12 408	538	4 297	260	17 503	70.9%	3.1%	24.6%	1.5%		3 666	16.6%	954	4.3%
Larde	23 673	14 293	60.4%	8 468	372	3 656	214	12 710	66.6%	2.9%	28.8%	1.7%		1 075	7.5%	508	3.6%
Liúpo	37 107	18 893	50.9%	9 014	774	5 959	604	16 351	55.1%	4.7%	36.4%	3.7%		1 978	10.5%	564	3.0%

Votos por distrito para assembleias provinciais

Votes per district for provincial assemblies

Distrito	Inscritos	Votantes	Afluência	Votos Válidos - Valid Votes											Votos em Branco		Votos Nulos	
District	Registered	Voters	Turnout	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Outros-others	Total	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Outros-others			Blank votes		Invalid votes	
Malema	109 510	39 904	36.4%	23 878	1 160	11 124	352	36 514	65.4%	3.2%	30.5%	1.0%			2 414	6.0%	976	2.4%
Meconta	90 620	35 103	38.7%	18 068	1 088	10 176	838	30 170	59.9%	3.6%	33.7%	2.8%			3 234	9.2%	1 699	4.8%
Mecuburi	85 334	32 885	38.5%	17 504	1 474	9 370	552	28 900	60.6%	5.1%	32.4%	1.9%			2 694	8.2%	1 291	3.9%
Memba	100 757	38 345	38.1%	17 884	1 139	11 598	926	31 547	56.7%	3.6%	36.8%	2.9%			4 906	12.8%	1 892	4.9%
Mogincual	31 785	15 673	49.3%	9 219	361	3 710	294	13 584	67.9%	2.7%	27.3%	2.2%			1 496	9.5%	593	3.8%
Mogovolas	116 143	48 907	42.1%	26 687	1 377	12 134	928	41 126	64.9%	3.3%	29.5%	2.3%			5 674	11.6%	2 107	4.3%
Moma	101 320	44 713	44.1%	21 372	1 136	14 551	1 478	38 537	55.5%	2.9%	37.8%	3.8%			4 412	9.9%	1 764	3.9%
Monapo	188 478	67 149	35.6%	34 656	2 723	21 956	1 296	60 631	57.2%	4.5%	36.2%	2.1%			6 518	9.7%	0	0.0%
Mossuril	67 344	35 316	52.4%	16 803	814	10 749	1 192	29 558	56.8%	2.8%	36.4%	4.0%			3 719	10.5%	2 039	5.8%
Muecate	38 883	15 222	39.1%	8 464	553	3 892	402	13 311	63.6%	4.2%	29.2%	3.0%			1 471	9.7%	440	2.9%
Murrupula	83 622	30 120	36.0%	17 117	924	8 260	545	26 846	63.8%	3.4%	30.8%	2.0%			2 611	8.7%	663	2.2%
Nacala-Porto	151 403	80 200	53.0%	36 440	1 331	35 810	570	74 151	49.1%	1.8%	48.3%	0.8%			3 263	4.1%	2 786	3.5%
Nacala-a-Velha	43 941	21 462	48.8%	10 843	593	6 111	321	17 868	60.7%	3.3%	34.2%	1.8%			1 695	7.9%	1 899	8.8%
Nacaroa	71 611	25 940	36.2%	12 152	889	6 991	473	20 505	59.3%	4.3%	34.1%	2.3%			3 676	14.2%	1 759	6.8%
Rapale	61 545	23 195	37.7%	12 465	856	6 812	424	20 557	60.6%	4.2%	33.1%	2.1%			1 854	8.0%	784	3.4%
Ribáue	117 730	43 038	36.6%	28 031	1 284	8 957	738	39 010	71.9%	3.3%	23.0%	1.9%			3 009	7.0%	1 019	2.4%
PROVINCE	2 361 973	1 030 780	43.6%	555 204	33 060	314 605	17 368	920 237	60.3%	3.6%	34.2%	1.9%			77 267	7.5%	33 276	3.2%
Zambézia																		
Quelimane	198 132	103 573	52.3%	51 689	4 639	39 371		95 699	54.0%	4.8%	41.1%				4 481	4.3%	3 393	3.3%
Alto Molócue	169 772	71 954	42.4%	41 847	1 999	21 387		65 233	64.2%	3.1%	32.8%				4 087	5.7%	2 634	3.7%
Gurué	190 673	59 940	31.4%	34 103	4 858	15 257		54 218	62.9%	9.0%	28.1%				3 485	5.8%	2 237	3.7%
Maganja da Cos	100 305	38 552	38.4%	19 933	1 714	11 487		33 134	60.2%	5.2%	34.7%				3 374	8.8%	2 044	5.3%
Milange	213 952	91 072	42.6%	46 904	2 555	29 068		78 527	59.7%	3.3%	37.0%				5 336	5.9%	7 209	7.9%
Mocuba	211 123	64 565	30.6%	35 768	2 364	20 065		58 197	61.5%	4.1%	34.5%				4 142	6.4%	2 226	3.4%
Chinde	35 372	17 360	49.1%	9 271	766	4 283		14 320	64.7%	5.3%	29.9%				1 824	10.5%	1 216	7.0%
Derre	40 943	16 705	40.8%	11 835	339	2 799		14 973	79.0%	2.3%	18.7%				1 161	7.0%	571	3.4%
Gilé*	103 486	30 582	29.6%	16 175	1 019	10 190		27 384	59.1%	3.7%	37.2%				2 204	7.2%	994	3.3%
Ile	103 919	52 323	50.3%	38 362	1 227	8 085		47 674	80.5%	2.6%	17.0%				3 271	6.3%	1 378	2.6%
Inhassunge	36 316	18 416	50.7%	11 208	688	4 234		16 130	69.5%	4.3%	26.2%				1 165	6.3%	1 121	6.1%
Luabo	24 716	12 038	48.7%	6 840	362	3 393		10 595	64.6%	3.4%	32.0%				949	7.9%	494	4.1%
Lugela	68 810	33 914	49.3%	24 097	943	5 045		30 085	80.1%	3.1%	16.8%				2 165	6.4%	1 664	4.9%
Mocubela	35 551	16 858	47.4%	9 909	653	4 226		14 788	67.0%	4.4%	28.6%				1 534	9.1%	536	3.2%
Mopeia	61 131	29 247	47.8%	20 021	452	5 719		26 192	76.4%	1.7%	21.8%				1 639	5.6%	1 416	4.8%
Molumbo	52 907	28 269	53.4%	18 965	875	5 410		25 250	75.1%	3.5%	21.4%				1 254	4.4%	1 765	6.2%
Morrumbala	130 710	56 568	43.3%	32 959	1 497	15 728		50 184	65.7%	3.0%	31.3%				4 271	7.6%	2 113	3.7%
Mulevala	34 016	16 812	49.4%	11 750	307	2 951		15 008	78.3%	2.0%	19.7%				990	5.9%	814	4.8%
Namacurra	81 186	34 492	42.5%	18 075	1 398	9 889		29 362	61.6%	4.8%	33.7%				3 474	10.1%	1 656	4.8%
Namarroi	60 072	26 511	44.1%	17 126	661	5 212		22 999	74.5%	2.9%	22.7%				1 631	6.2%	1 881	7.1%
Nicoadala	81 854	46 496	56.8%	29 624	1 624	11 102		42 350	70.0%	3.8%	26.2%				2 739	5.9%	1 407	3.0%
Pebane	105 179	55 793	53.0%	30 355	1 864	17 623		49 842	60.9%	3.7%	35.4%				3 985	7.1%	1 966	3.5%
PROVINCE	2 140 125	922 040	43.1%	536 816	32 804	252 524		822 144	65.3%	4.0%	30.7%				59 161	6.4%	40 735	4.4%
Tete																		
Tete Cidade	166 572	89 728	53.9%	57 362	3 150	24 274		84 786	67.7%	3.7%	28.6%				3 233	3.6%	1 709	1.9%
Angónia	213 125	91 632	43.0%	37 890	3 941	37 177		79 008	48.0%	5.0%	47.1%				6 789	7.4%	5 835	6.4%
Cahora Bassa	56 913	44 952	79.0%	39 396	649	2 287		42 332	93.1%	1.5%	5.4%				1 578	3.5%	1 042	2.3%

Votos por distrito para assembleias provinciais

Votes per district for provincial assemblies


Distrito	Inscritos	Votantes	Afluência	Votos Válidos - Valid Votes										Votos em Branco		Votos Nulos	
District	Registered	Voters	Turnout	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Outros-others	Total	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Outros-others		Blank votes		Invalid votes	
Changara	52 128	44 891	86.1%	41 270	226	1 150		42 646	96.8%	0.5%	2.7%			1 448	3.2%	797	1.8%
Chifunde	56 599	35 175	62.1%	27 400	584	4 344		32 328	84.8%	1.8%	13.4%			1 529	4.3%	1 318	3.7%
Chiúta	44 212	30 817	69.7%	25 215	456	2 332		28 003	90.0%	1.6%	8.3%			1 244	4.0%	1 570	5.1%
Macanga	43 645	35 880	82.2%	29 659	477	3 549		33 685	88.0%	1.4%	10.5%			968	2.7%	1 227	3.4%
Magoé	46 130	35 804	77.6%	32 016	645	1 377		34 038	94.1%	1.9%	4.0%			1 222	3.4%	544	1.5%
Marávia	42 370	25 067	59.2%	16 075	466	5 774		22 315	72.0%	2.1%	25.9%			1 594	6.4%	1 158	4.6%
Moatize	157 949	71 284	45.1%	36 030	1 998	25 535		63 563	56.7%	3.1%	40.2%			5 459	7.7%	2 262	3.2%
Mutarara	74 088	50 228	67.8%	39 430	544	6 052		46 026	85.7%	1.2%	13.1%			1 831	3.6%	2 371	4.7%
Tsangano	64 399	34 339	53.3%	23 407	640	6 684		30 731	76.2%	2.1%	21.8%			1 631	4.7%	1 977	5.8%
Zumbu	32 881	29 725	90.4%	24 544	245	2 672		27 461	89.4%	0.9%	9.7%			365	1.2%	1 899	6.4%
Marara	31 326	25 611	81.8%	22 306	287	1 109		23 702	94.1%	1.2%	4.7%			1 383	5.4%	526	2.1%
Doa	37 041	24 785	66.9%	17 778	383	4 135		22 296	79.7%	1.7%	18.5%			1 876	7.6%	613	2.5%
PROVINCE	1 119 378	669 918	59.8%	469 778	14 691	128 451		612 920	76.6%	2.4%	21.0%			32 150	4.8%	24 848	3.7%
Manica																	
Chimoio	191 647	103 278	53.9%	63 333	4 901	30 902		99 136	63.9%	4.9%	31.2%			2 977	2.9%	1 164	1.1%
Báruè	102 316	70 487	68.9%	57 290	887	8 366		66 543	86.1%	1.3%	12.6%			3 035	4.3%	909	1.3%
Gondola	96 732	50 325	52.0%	33 784	1 592	11 473		46 849	72.1%	3.4%	24.5%			2 433	4.8%	1 043	2.1%
Manica Dist.	101 493	57 763	56.9%	40 189	1 509	12 337		54 035	74.4%	2.8%	22.8%			2 783	4.8%	944	1.6%
Guro	40 687	29 984	73.7%	23 080	419	4 186		27 685	83.4%	1.5%	15.1%			1 772	5.9%	527	1.8%
Macate	38 837	25 135	64.7%	18 164	475	4 723		23 362	77.8%	2.0%	20.2%			1 194	4.8%	579	2.3%
Machaze	51 960	32 220	62.0%	17 926	628	9 839		28 393	63.1%	2.2%	34.7%			2 566	8.0%	1 261	3.9%
Macossa	22 099	16 896	76.5%	12 303	224	3 110		15 637	78.7%	1.4%	19.9%			1 020	6.0%	239	1.4%
Mossurize	81 610	47 496	58.2%	27 195	959	13 555		41 709	65.2%	2.3%	32.5%			3 302	7.0%	2 485	5.2%
Sussendnga	81 123	41 597	51.3%	28 079	992	8 796		37 867	74.2%	2.6%	23.2%			2 759	6.6%	970	2.3%
Tambara	23 103	18 588	80.5%	14 175	216	2 871		17 262	82.1%	1.3%	16.6%			1 070	5.8%	256	1.4%
Vanduzi	61 819	48 757	78.9%	36 750	1 039	8 136		45 925	80.0%	2.3%	17.7%			2 040	4.2%	792	1.6%
PROVINCE	893 426	542 526	60.7%	372 269	13 841	118 296		504 406	73.8%	2.7%	23.5%			26 951	5.0%	11 169	2.1%
Sofala																	
Beira	330 407	171 520	51.9%	79 631	51 728	33 194	Parena	477	165 030	48.3%	31.3%	20.1%	0.3%	3 367	2.0%	3 123	1.8%
Buzi	67 692	34 780	51.4%	15 588	3 375	11 605	315	30 883	50.5%	10.9%	37.6%	1.0%		1 800	5.2%	2 097	6.0%
Caia	47 932	30 239	63.1%	23 934	565	4 166	96	28 761	83.2%	2.0%	14.5%	0.3%		1 100	3.6%	378	1.3%
Chemba	35 432	23 156	65.4%	16 958	356	3 693	174	21 181	80.1%	1.7%	17.4%	0.8%		1 388	6.0%	587	2.5%
Cheringoma	25 308	14 871	58.8%	8 333	291	4 903	113	13 640	61.1%	2.1%	35.9%	0.8%		681	4.6%	550	3.7%
Chibabava	38 407	20 111	52.4%	14 199	298	3 069	104	17 670	80.4%	1.7%	17.4%	0.6%		794	3.9%	1 647	8.2%
Dondo	98 917	70 507	71.3%	52 450	3 526	11 240	168	67 384	77.8%	5.2%	16.7%	0.2%		1 568	2.2%	1 555	2.2%
Gorongosa	90 528	42 456	46.9%	25 509	1 624	10 063	432	37 628	67.8%	4.3%	26.7%	1.1%		3 791	8.9%	1 037	2.4%
Marchanga	21 734	13 564	62.4%	7 690	1 924	2 360	122	12 096	63.6%	15.9%	19.5%	1.0%		518	3.8%	950	7.0%
Maríngue	40 783	25 264	61.9%	17 986	469	4 027	233	22 715	79.2%	2.1%	17.7%	1.0%		1 788	7.1%	761	3.0%
Marromeu	75 751	54 857	72.4%	44 190	2 873	6 574	137	53 774	82.2%	5.3%	12.2%	0.3%		634	1.2%	449	0.8%
Muanza	22 428	17 305	77.2%	13 742	277	2 615	39	16 673	82.4%	1.7%	15.7%	0.2%		335	1.9%	297	1.7%
Nhamatanda	134 035	71 408	53.3%	44 984	2 634	17 879	560	66 057	68.1%	4.0%	27.1%	0.8%		3 728	5.2%	1 623	2.3%
PROVINCE	1 029 354	590 038	57.3%	365 194	69 940	115 388	2 970	553 492	66.0%	12.6%	20.8%	0.5%		21 492	3.6%	15 054	2.6%
Inhambane																	
Inhambane Cid.	48 358	27 451	56.8%	20 687	1 411	3 719	Pareso	113	25 930	79.8%	5.4%	14.3%	0.4%	791	2.9%	730	2.7%

Votos por distrito para assembleias provinciais

Votes per district for provincial assemblies

Distrito	Inscritos	Votantes	Afluência	Votos Válidos - Valid Votes												Votos em Branco		Votos Nulos	
District	Registered	Voters	Turnout	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Outros-others	Total	Frelimo	MDM	Renamo	Outros-others				Blank votes		Invalid votes	
Funhalouro	19 031	16 005	84.1%	14 197	197	404	106	14 904	95.3%	1.3%	2.7%	0.7%				710	4.4%	391	2.4%
Govuro	18 306	12 422	67.9%	7 558	597	3 072	118	11 345	66.6%	5.3%	27.1%	1.0%				650	5.2%	427	3.4%
Homoíne	45 262	29 796	65.8%	22 655	1 251	3 087	293	27 286	83.0%	4.6%	11.3%	1.1%				1 593	5.3%	917	3.1%
Inharrime	44 288	22 567	51.0%	16 200	939	2 853	313	20 305	79.8%	4.6%	14.1%	1.5%				1 520	6.7%	742	3.3%
Inhassoro	26 977	19 550	72.5%	15 655	559	1 426	148	17 788	88.0%	3.1%	8.0%	0.8%				1 032	5.3%	730	3.7%
Jangamo	41 156	21 553	52.4%	15 929	993	2 391	276	19 589	81.3%	5.1%	12.2%	1.4%				1 211	5.6%	753	3.5%
Mabote	22 446	18 432	82.1%	15 743	521	720	101	17 085	92.1%	3.0%	4.2%	0.6%				779	4.2%	568	3.1%
Massinga	104 074	41 285	39.7%	26 961	2 207	7 891	677	37 736	71.4%	5.8%	20.9%	1.8%				2 221	5.4%	1 328	3.2%
Maxixe	70 431	34 122	48.4%	25 153	1 905	4 944	227	32 229	78.0%	5.9%	15.3%	0.7%				1 081	3.2%	812	2.4%
Morrumbene	55 189	28 410	51.5%	18 704	1 413	5 375	367	25 859	72.3%	5.5%	20.8%	1.4%				1 529	5.4%	1 022	3.6%
Panda	18 674	14 027	75.1%	11 293	402	779	129	12 603	89.6%	3.2%	6.2%	1.0%				978	7.0%	446	3.2%
Vilankulo	78 161	39 641	50.7%	27 845	1 770	6 338	439	36 392	76.5%	4.9%	17.4%	1.2%				2 174	5.5%	1 075	2.7%
Zavala	64 789	29 312	45.2%	21 146	1 208	3 788	316	26 458	79.9%	4.6%	14.3%	1.2%				1 701	5.8%	1 153	3.9%
PROVINCE	657 142	354 573	54.0%	259 726	15 373	46 787	3 623	325 509	79.8%	4.7%	14.4%	1.1%				17 970	5.1%	11 094	3.1%
Gaza																			
Xai-Xai	147 027	60 257	41.0%	47 966	3 556	6 643		58 165	82.5%	6.1%	11.4%					1 102	1.8%	990	1.6%
Bilene	125 758	65 278	51.9%	58 808	1 710	1 962		62 480	94.1%	2.7%	3.1%					1 591	2.4%	1 207	1.8%
Chibuto	181 793	114 565	63.0%	106 180	1 914	1 918		110 012	96.5%	1.7%	1.7%					2 657	2.3%	1 896	1.7%
Chicualacuala	18 262	17 510	95.9%	17 241	31	86		17 358	99.3%	0.2%	0.5%					44	0.3%	108	0.6%
Chigubo	13 982	13 318	95.3%	13 070	9	17		13 096	99.8%	0.1%	0.1%					61	0.5%	161	1.2%
Chokwe	238 447	163 163	68.4%	151 662	3 535	3 063		158 260	95.8%	2.2%	1.9%					2 797	1.7%	2 106	1.3%
Chongoene	82 443	57 665	69.9%	51 909	1 662	1 954		55 525	93.5%	3.0%	3.5%					1 255	2.2%	885	1.5%
Guijá	52 284	47 213	90.3%	45 460	353	415		46 228	98.3%	0.8%	0.9%					412	0.9%	573	1.2%
Limpopo	105 095	68 475	65.2%	62 311	1 340	1 492		65 143	95.7%	2.1%	2.3%					2 218	3.2%	1 114	1.6%
Mabalane	19 435	17 936	92.3%	17 161	83	87		17 331	99.0%	0.5%	0.5%					106	0.6%	499	2.8%
Mandlakazi	131 615	58 799	44.7%	53 149	1 032	1 735		55 916	95.1%	1.8%	3.1%					1 755	3.0%	1 128	1.9%
Mapai	15 660	14 300	91.3%	13 850	43	136		14 029	98.7%	0.3%	1.0%					80	0.6%	191	1.3%
Massangena	12 287	11 785	95.9%	11 570	45	44		11 659	99.2%	0.4%	0.4%					16	0.1%	110	0.9%
Massingir	21 923	19 303	88.0%	18 717	31	187		18 935	98.8%	0.2%	1.0%					104	0.5%	264	1.4%
PROVINCE	1 166 011	729 567	62.6%	669 074	15 324	19 739		704 137	95.0%	2.2%	2.8%					14 198	1.9%	11 232	1.5%
Maputo Prov							Parena	Pareso				Parena	Pareso						
Matola	577 903	309 819	53.6%	186 541	19 624	92 652	630	613	300 060	62.2%	6.5%	30.9%	0.2%	0.2%		5 176	1.7%	4 583	1.5%
Boane	118 033	60 825	51.5%	39 300	3 559	14 776	141	193	57 969	67.8%	6.1%	25.5%	0.2%	0.3%		1 660	2.7%	1 196	2.0%
Magude	25 793	18 380	71.3%	15 253	560	1 162	69	88	17 132	89.0%	3.3%	6.8%	0.4%	0.5%		821	4.5%	427	2.3%
Manhiça	106 903	55 347	51.8%	47 752	2 387	3 892	326	407	54 763	87.2%	4.4%	7.1%	0.6%	0.7%		353	0.6%	230	0.4%
Marracuene	96 917	50 921	52.5%	35 088	2 799	10 438	79	67	48 471	72.4%	5.8%	21.5%	0.2%	0.1%		1 218	2.4%	1 232	2.4%
Matutuíne	21 584	15 824	73.3%	13 120	482	1 474	27	41	15 144	86.6%	3.2%	9.7%	0.2%	0.3%		371	2.3%	309	2.0%
Moamba	40 545	24 802	61.2%	19 405	873	3 000	81	108	23 467	82.7%	3.7%	12.8%	0.3%	0.5%		703	2.8%	632	2.5%
Namaacha	28 120	16 770	59.6%	13 629	535	1 629	41	55	15 889	85.8%	3.4%	10.3%	0.3%	0.3%		578	3.4%	303	1.8%
PROVINCE	1 015 798	552 688	54.4%	370 088	30 819	129 023	1 394	1 572	532 896	69.4%	5.8%	24.2%	0.3%	0.3%		10 880	2.0%	8 912	1.6%
							Outros					Outros							
Nacional	12 245 995	6 276 264	51.3%	4 153 883	253 021	1 309 981	30 800		5 747 684	72.3%	4.4%	22.8%	0.5%			344 431	5.5%	184 147	2.9%

Provincial assemblies are in the 10 provinces but not Maputo City, Africa, or Europe. Constituencies are the districts, plus a constituency for the entire province. Electors vote only once but the vote is applied to both district and province lists. Thus the provincial vote is the total of the district votes. The head of the provincial list with the most votes is elected governor.



Partners:



EMBAIXADA DA NORUEGA



Published by CIP, Centro de Integridade Pública (Public Integrity Centre),

Rua Fernão Melo e Castro, nº 124, Maputo. eleicoes@cipeleicoes.org <https://cipeleicoes.org/eng/>

Detailed coverage 2019 national elections is again being provided by the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin*, which has covered all of Mozambique's multi-party elections. We will have a large team of local journalists throughout the country, ensuring that our reports are accurate and verified.

The elections newsletter is also in Portuguese; para subscriver <http://eepurl.com/gnZXPz>

The newsletters covering the 2018 local elections are on <http://bit.ly/LocEI2018>

Newsletters from 2013 local elections and 2014 national elections are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

There are two archives of historic elections data, at IESE on <http://www.iese.ac.mz/eleicoes-resultados/> and at London School of Economics on <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

2019 General Elections is part of the Votar Moçambique programme



VOTAR
MOÇAMBIQUE

Programme financed by:



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

Embaixada da Suíça em Moçambique



EUROPEAN UNION

Co-financer:



COOPERAÇÃO
AUSTRIACA PARA O
DESENVOLVIMENTO